juancegomez has left 2819 comments

juancegomez comments on The Interpol Findings on Reyes' data....

Why does the U.S. provide aid to Colombia if our own defense budget makes such aid look small in comparison, whether on a yearly or periodic basis? I am not talking about the details of the claim you are referencing, per se, but about the logic which you seem to find suspect. Personally, I don't think that having access to greater amounts of money makes small amounts of additional aid (whether in cash, credit, services or resources) useless. Now, talking about one part of the claim, nobody knows FARC's real financial status, so simply calling them "rich" through drug trafficking, just like that, tells us very little about what the alleged (I am not assuming it is necessarily true or correct) 300 million could be used for.

juancegomez comments on The Interpol Findings on Reyes' data....

There were some envoys that wanted to meet with him, perhaps to arrange such a meeting, but Sarkozy himself wasn't in the area or anything, and even if he did meet with "Reyes", that doesn't mean that the magical result would be the freedom of Ingrid.

juancegomez comments on The Interpol Findings on Reyes' data....

Do you really think, buggy, that Ingrid was "finally" going to be freed? I have no doubt that the subject would have been discussed and that some progress could be made, but to pretend that FARC does not know that Ingrid is their best "card"....and would be willing to free her "just" at that precise moment...just angry remarks from Ingrid's relatives and Correa are not enough to make that wish a reality.

juancegomez comments on Colombian paramilitary warlords extradited

Here's an excerpt from a letter by HRW, way back in January of this year. The letter is long and talks about many other issues, which deserve their own attention, but this is particularly relevant in the current context. HRW's Vivanco has a bit of a point right now, which is why there must be efforts to avoid impunity and to keep the judicial processes from stopping, but let's see what HRW was saying a couple of months ago. HRW was pretty much in favor of extraditing paramilitary commanders to the U.S. ,and in fact asked for it to be used as a pre-condition for approval of the FTA. I seem to recall that there were letters from U.S. Democrats and other NGOs pretty much asking for extraditions as well. All other issues aside, as I already commented about them....one could claim Uribe is following their logic, ironically enough, although that's certainly not his only interest. Perhaps, again, it would have been better to do this much more gradually, I agree, but the main idea is that extraditions were being demanded from several U.S. sources, not just the Bush administration, and now they have come. ------------- Letter to US Trade Representative Schwab on Colombia Free Trade Agreement January 23, 2008 Ambassador Susan C. Schwab United States Trade Representative 600 17th Street, NW Washington, DC 20508 Dear Ambassador Schwab, .... Effectively Use Leverage of Extradition The most effective leverage that the Colombian government has over paramilitary leaders is the threat of extradition to the United States. Many of Colombia’s paramilitary leaders are wanted in the United States on charges of illegal drug trafficking. It was primarily the fear of extradition to the United States that initially led them to negotiate a “demobilization" program with President Uribe that would allow them to escape extradition by serving much reduced sentences for their crimes in Colombia.9 Today the threat of extradition could be used by the government to compel paramilitary commanders to comply fully with their obligations under the Justice and Peace Law to confess, surrender illegal assets, demobilize their troops, and cease from engaging in criminal activity. However, for this threat to be effective, it must actually be applied to paramilitary leaders who fail to fulfill their obligations or engage in new crimes. The threat must also remain applicable indefinitely, to ensure that commanders have an incentive to refrain from committing new crimes. Unfortunately, the Justice and Peace Law creates a loophole that allows paramilitary commanders to neutralize the threat of extradition to the United States. During the demobilization process, they can confess to the crimes for which they face charges in the United States and then receive reduced sentences for those crimes under the terms of the Justice and Peace Law. Under Colombian law, they are then protected on double jeopardy grounds from extradition for these crimes. As a precondition for FTA ratification, the US should insist that the Colombian government: 1. Prevent commanders from blocking extradition by promoting legislation that bars the application of the Justice and Peace Law to acts for which the United States has requested extradition and, until such legislation is passed, advising the Attorney General’s Office to refrain from prosecuting paramilitaries for these acts; 2. Extradite paramilitary commanders who are wanted in the United States and who have failed, in full or in part, to confess, surrender illegal assets, demobilize their troops and cease their criminal activities.10 ... Sincerely, Kenneth Roth Executive Director http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/01/25/colomb17876.htm

juancegomez comments on Colombian paramilitary warlords extradited

We'll see, durito. jaramillo: That part is easy enough, but I'm more worried about what they will do in response to the extraditions, not about the figureheads who will be eventually replaced, peacefully or otherwise.

juancegomez comments on Colombian paramilitary warlords extradited

On the other hand...interpretations of the motives aside, something else that isn't as clear cut is this: What will happen to the newly formed (or never demobilized, depending on each case) "criminal gangs"? This is hardly the end of paramilitarism in Colombia, to say the least, but if these individuals were in fact continuing to commit crimes, as several indications seemed to show, they might as well order their subordinates to unleash hell as a response. I would be very cautious.

juancegomez comments on Colombian paramilitary warlords extradited

About Lehder, taking this with a grain of salt, as it's Wikipedia, and I don't know how true it may be... "According to journalist and author Tamara S. Inscoe-Johnson, who worked on the Lehder defense during the time in question, Lehder was simply transferred to another prison and has continued to be held in WITSEC, which is the Bureau of Prisons' version of the federal Witness Protection Program. Inscoe-Johnson argued that Lehder had not been released, despite Internet rumors to the contrary. Inscoe-Johnson's work on Lehder entitled "Norman's Cay: The True Story of Carlos Lehder and the Medellin Cartel", details why the author believes that Lehder will never be released. Allegedly, Lehder would be privy to secret information regarding the CIA's and his own involvement in the Iran-Contra affair. Carlos Lehder's ongoing legal battles confirm Lehder remains imprisoned in the US, and that he is not likely to be released anytime soon. On July 22, 2005 he appeared in the US Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit to contest his sentence. Lehder appeared pro se, arguing that the United States failed to perform its obligations under a cooperation agreement he had entered into with the United States Attorney's Office, after he held up his end of the deal. (United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 136 Fed. Appx. 324; 2005). In May 2007, he requested the Colombian Supreme Court to order the Colombian government to request from the United States his release because of the violations of his cooperation agreement." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Lehder#Capture.2C_trial_and_whereabouts

juancegomez comments on Colombian paramilitary warlords extradited

I do suppose that, in part, this was done in order to reduce internal and international pressure, in several ways. Well, at the very least this takes care of the whole "why aren't they extraditing the paramilitaries too" complaint. It's not like nobody had ever mentioned it, let's not pretend. Sometime ago, it wasn't uncommon to hear or read about it. From that point of view, it's "bad if you do it, bad if you don't do it", I guess. Now, it's up to their victims to follow them and use all the available means of judicial cooperation and U.S. law to prosecute them there, as soon as possible, so that they aren't only prosecuted of drug-related charges. In a way, that is indeed a bad sign in terms of Colombian sovereignty, admittedly, and I would have preferred either no extraditions or a more gradual process, but it may allow for better judicial cases in the long run, if more charges can be raised against them other than just drug dealing. We'll see. I think webmanco's fears aren't completely unsubstantiated, in concept, but I do feel they are much exaggerated at this point. Even if there are negotiations, their outcome will not be identical and won't always be significantly positive for the criminal. Unless you own a crystal ball or privileged information, it's a bit of a leap to say they'll only be five years in jail and will be granted citizenship.

juancegomez comments on USAID Extending Life of Colombian 'Alternative Development' Program

Apparently this was published way back in 2005, so it's not a recent news story...it would be interesting to know what has happened in the meanwhile.

juancegomez comments on Other bad/good news

Not that I can recall, so probably not...although the press isn't exactly helpful at this time, but if there is anything else, then the same potential problem would result.

juancegomez comments on On Democracy in Colombia... "Mark Him on the Ballot - The One Wearing Glasses"

romy: "Law and order" may not be the best term...perhaps "law and order against FARC" would be a more explicit and accurate term for what I meant, than the more general concept which would in fact be dangerous for the paramilitaries and other criminals at large. EDIT: As for stability, I can say that I also hope that the medicine, whatever actually ends up happening, is not worse than the sickness, so to speak. Some pain will be inevitable if the crisis increases, but that doesn't mean that the situation shouldn't be handled in the way that harms Colombia as little as possible. That doesn't mean impunity, mind you. There are institutions that, as weak or questionable as they may seem, have to fulfill their responsibilities.

juancegomez comments on Chavez- Is there reason for the paranoia?

Chavez does have reasons to be worried about the U.S., but I do not believe he has reason to be worried about any imminent invasion, beyond his usual rhetorics, even if he somehow ended up on the terror list (which isn't certain, press headlines aside...). At most, I think he would then fear sanctions, and even those would be limited, considering Venezuela's importance as an oil exporter, because I don't think the U.S. wants to piss off Chavez that much. Again, later events may be more complicated than that, but for now I don't think that a war is imminent, so I am only theoretically worried about its consequences.

juancegomez comments on Other bad/good news

romy: The article is fair enough for what it is, but one of the details that readers may overlook is this: the process has to go through at least four or five different jurisdictions. See below: ----------------------------------------- Mayo 9 de 2008 - En cinco escenarios judiciales se ventilará caso de supuesto pago a Yidis Medina por reelección En la Fiscalía, la Comisión de Acusaciones, el Consejo de la Judicatura, la Procuraduría y la Corte Suprema de Justicia ya se comenzó a mover el trámite del proceso. La Corte se prepara para entrar en el último tramo del proceso contra Yidis. Le negó la detención domiciliaria, entre otras razones porque en su primer encuentro con la Corte, hace cuatro años, dio una versión radicalmente opuesta a la que ahora está entregando. Ahora, los magistrados de la Sala Penal deben dar un concepto sobre su solicitud de sentencia anticipada, un paso que se hará después de que quede en firme la medida de aseguramiento de este jueves. Según los magistrados, la ex congresista ocultó durante todo este tiempo las pruebas de que habría vendido su voto y la supuesta intervención de funcionarios públicos que la indujeron a tomar esa decisión. Esa primera versión llevó a la Corte a disponer el archivo del proceso, que se reactivó hace apenas un mes tras varias declaraciones de Yidis y el anuncio de un libro sobre la reelección. Por esta razón, los miembros del alto tribunal creen que en libertad, la ex congresista estaría en "capacidad potencial" de interferir con la acción de la justicia. La Procuraduría, por lo pronto, reabrió el proceso disciplinario que el año pasado le había cerrado a Medina por el tema de la reelección y evalúa la apertura de procesos disciplinarios contra algunos de los funcionarios mencionados por ella ante la Corte. El Consejo de la Judicatura, por su lado, está a la espera de la notificación formal de la Corte sobre dos abogados que, según la versión de Yidis, el Gobierno puso a su disposición para que la asesoraran ante la Corte, el Consejo de Estado y la Corte Suprema después de la votación del 2004. Y el vicefiscal general, Guillermo Mendoza Diago, se prepara para evaluar el proceso remitido por la Corte en el caso del ex ministro y embajador Sabas Pretelt y el ministro Diego Palacio. Lo que sigue en la Corte Suprema La Sala Penal llamará a Medina para determinar en un acta de cargos la gravedad del delito, la condena a imponer, la reducciones de la pena y su sitio de reclusión. Esto se presenta a consideración de los magistrados, que en decisión colegiada decidirán con base en la validez de su confesión y las pruebas que aportó al caso. La Corte investiga de manera paralela la actuación seguida por el ex representante Teodolindo Avendaño y está estableciendo si existen méritos para iniciar una investigación contra el senador Iván Díaz Matéus, el titular de la curul que Yidis ocupó transitoriamente hace cuatro años. Las versiones que dio ella sobre la participación de ambos en los hechos son el insumo básico con el que cuenta la Corte. En la Comisión de Acusaciones La Corte aclaró el pasado jueves que no pidió investigar al presidente �?lvaro Uribe sino que envió las copias de las declaraciones de Yidis Medina para que se anexen a una demanda que entabló el senador del Polo Luis Carlos Avellaneda por supuestas irregularidades en el trámite de la reelección. En el caso de la denuncia del senador, la Comisión no ha nombrado aún un investigador y evalúa si designa un triunvirato de representantes para que haga la investigación. Las cuentas que hace Yidis Por colaboración con la justicia y la valoración que los magistrados hicieron de las pruebas aportadas por Yidis, su defensa hace cálculos de unos tres años en prisión, pues el delito por el que está procesada -cohecho- tiene una pena de entre cinco y ocho años. Podría atravesarse, sin embargo, una situación sobre la que habló ayer el abogado Jaime Lombana, apoderado del ministro Diego Palacio, uno de los mencionados por la ex congresista. Lombana dijo que la Corte debe "ampliar las imputaciones en contra de Yidis por los delitos de concusión, fraude procesal, falsa denuncia, falso testimonio y, especialmente, por secuestro". Ella admite que mintió en sus primeras versiones ante la Corte Suprema y la Procuraduría y que 'amarró' a sus cuotas burocráticas a través de pagarés y cartas de renuncia firmadas anticipadamente. Esas investigaciones serían de competencia de la Fiscalía General y no de la Corte. Lo que le toca al Vicefiscal Tras la remisión de copias desde la Corte, la decisión de abrir investigación contra el ex ministro y embajador Sabas Pretelt y el ministro de Protección, Diego Palacio, quedará en manos del vicefiscal Guillermo Mendoza Diago. Por competencia, la investigación la debía llevar el fiscal general, Mario Iguarán, quien ya anunció que se declarará impedido para conocer de los hechos porque fue subalterno de Sabas Pretelt. Los casos de los demás funcionarios que resulten implicados pasarían a un fiscal ordinario. En caso de una recusación o un eventual impedimento del Vicefiscal General para conocer del proceso, la Corte entraría a resolver. De admitirlo, nombraría un fiscal Ad hoc. REDACCIÓN JUSTICIA http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/2008-05-10/ARTICULO-PRINTER_FRIENDLY-PRINTER_FRIENDLY-4156672.html ------------ It is reasonable to suppose that the specific results of each judicial instance will be different, even if they have to follow a general line of thought. At first glance I would agree with you, that simply proving that the vote was "bought" would seem to be enough to declare it a crime. And it probably is. But there is a rather large Pandora's Box waiting behind it. What was really offered, who is responsible for it, and how much of it can be considered to be criminal in nature? She has named many officials, yes, although that doesn't mean that all of them will be found guilty. Let us not forget that Yidis herself is not a mere witness, but in fact one of the accused, in part through self-incrimination and also because she previously lied to the Supreme Court. That means she has to be scrutinized, not automatically believed, even if she did let herself be illegally "convinced". And what does this mean for reelection or for any other measure that Medina may have voted for (if applicable)? Outside logic would indicate that such votes should be considered null and invalid, but judicial logic may not necessarily agree, to an extent. Or to put it another way, even if the process that led to the approval of reelection is declared illegal, that doesn't automatically mean that Uribe will lose his presidential seat right now. Reelection could be removed from the Constitution, but it may not be retroactively nullified. Frankly, we would need to be constitutional judges in order to reach a real conclusion.

juancegomez comments on FARC to train Venezuela's military

This is another case where I'd like to read the documents myself, not what others say about them. I can see more than a few FARC sympathizers being involved in such activities, but the specifics make a big difference and it would be interesting to read the documents in their proper context. The previously released documents, for all their faults, at least allowed that. Hopefully more of them are made publicly available after May 15-16. As for guerrilla warfare...I understand that guerrilla warfare's strength is usually its defensive potential. But the ultimate goal of a guerrilla is to seize power. Surviving is essential to that goal, and of course survival requires a certain amount of support, but victory is another ballgame. And guerrilla warfare alone and enough support to survive is not sufficient for that. You need enough support to win, for starters, as well as enough strength. Or, alternatively, get rid of your enemy's support and strength. FARC has NOT accomplished so far, and they've probably hurt themselves politically and morally too much by now, even if their military and economic front has acquired certain self-sufficiency in exchange for it.

juancegomez comments on Scum wearing the army uniform sentenced to rot and die in prison

He may not be the only person responsible, but his own responsibility is no mere joke, as the courts have determined. Good riddance.

juancegomez comments on Other bad/good news

While it is possible...I am not too certain that we can speak of a "transition" at this point, let alone what kind...even if a crime has occurred. That Medina did in fact "sell" her vote, or was otherwise "convinced", may not be hard to prove. But what matters are the judicial ramifications of it. Two years, what is left in Uribe's term, may not be much but it's still a long time in relative terms. A lot could still happen, either to save him or to doom him. Judicially speaking, I say, since his political armor is still very resistant. While Uribe appears to be threatened right now, he will have the chance to defend himself in Congress and, if applicable, in Court. And so will everyone else who has been rightfully or wrongfully implicated. If Medina's testimony falls apart before certain details, and it seems she hasn't been that consistent in a couple of places (she is no angel or mere victim of circumstance), the resulting responsibilities will vary accordingly.

juancegomez comments on On Democracy in Colombia... "Mark Him on the Ballot - The One Wearing Glasses"

I lost half of my initial post, but here I am typing it up again, somehow. The subject has come up before, just not recently. I have a certain amount of respect but also a few mixed feelings regarding IPS and Constanza Vieira. On one hand, they do not make stories up and the main facts of their reporting do have real sources. On the other, their political activism is quite evident, and certain details may get lost along the way because of it. I do not doubt that a woman known as "L" made the previous declarations. I have no way of confirming their accuracy, but I will assume that they refer to real events, in good faith. I do not doubt -in fact this is certainly true- that there were many small towns, villages and other places where the paramilitaries pressured people into voting for Uribe. This is not, unfortunately, a new story. But it doesn't stop there. The paramilitaries have also pressured people to vote for other candidates, or to vote against a candidate they do not like. The existence of the current parapolitics scandal as a whole is enough to raise a few flags. And, lest one forget it, the guerrillas have resorted to exactly the same kind of pressure. Although they usually prefer to simply prevent people from voting at all, by threatening people and burning ballot boxes, there have been cases where it has been denounced that the guerrillas have forced people to vote for specific candidates. What we do not know is how many people actually obeyed that pressure and how many didn't, even if they felt it. That requires, at least, a statistical analysis of each locality and a judicial review. López and others like the Nuevo Arco Iris guys have only done the most basic work so far, but it is valuable work nevertheless. Even though it doesn't, of course, resolve the issue of each person's individual vote, it can speak of general trends...and of irregularities. The phenomenon as a whole, however, is not a novelty or a product of current politics, and in fact it goes back a long way. And if we go back far enough, we will find that local clientelism and machine politics is at the root of all things, and is essentially the ultimate logic behind this. In many remote or merely impoverished localities, someone usually feels (or the voting community is so used to it that it is expected or even demanded) that they have to "direct" or "convince" voters into voting for certain candidates. Perhaps they have been contracted by a higher ranking regional or national politician, perhaps they come to him offering votes that are already "secure", or will simply show up later and demand favors because "I campaigned for you". It's a chain, and it has been better described by certain authors. In any case...this is usually done through the provision of specific, individual or communitarian benefits, large and small, or simply their being promised. That sounds like normal campaigning, on the surface, and maybe it is meant to be when all is said and done, except that it involves corruption in many cases. Naturally. But if necessary, that also includes forcing boycotts or doing something to sabotage any votes for someone else. This is one of the uglier faces of Colombian politics and the two main parties are largely responsible for allowing it to happen in the first place. And, I would be willing to bet, there is no major party that isn't at least mildly tainted by it. I wouldn't even swear that *nobody* in the opposition has done it. It is not just a matter of corruption, however, since threats of violence -or actual instances of it- can and have been used in similar circumstances as well. This is not an invention of the paramilitaries, let alone the guerrillas. That is a clear historical trend that one cannot erase. It is not something that begins and ends with Uribe. That being the case, however, the natural conclusion is that the legitimacy of the political system is, in essence, compromised. I would not disagree, although I would not say that there is none at all. Electoral reforms have made urban voting more transparent over the decades -not perfectly so of course-, but in many small towns and even impoverished areas of cities things may not be that different. Or they might even be worse than the usual tradition, given the presence of paramilitary and guerrilla "intermediaries" in situations that are similar to those previously described. From a strictly puritan point of view, many elections in Colombia could be considered either invalid or at least suspect. But that exercise is merely academic at this point. What matters the most is the present, and after it the future. And the present does, in fact, involve Uribe. Uribe failed to take action and decisively reject paramilitary support in the recent past, leading to his current election and reelection. It was clearly logical that paramilitaries would support a strong "law and order" candidate, just as it was natural that the guerrillas would do everything in their power to undermine him. But it is not about what is "logical". It is about what each person knew and what they did about it. Did he ask for this? Did he help arrange it? That is the key element that will determine the judicial responsibilities, in the end. How can we prevent it? I am not feeling too creative right now, unfortunately, so I can't really say. "Uribe won the 2002 election with 53 percent of the vote. If he had taken 300,000 fewer votes, a runoff would have been necessary, in which an alliance of his adversaries (the social democratic Liberal Party and the left) would have stood a chance." I fear this is wishful thinking. Uribe vs. Serpa, even a Serpa supported by "everyone else", would have likely led us down the same road. Serpa, while very popular with the Liberal base, had lost a lot of support due to the Samper connection. Even if many third party candidates joined him, others would likely prefer Uribe over him. Because, most importantly, the political situation of the country as a whole had explicitly turned against FARC after the Caguán fiasco. For better *and* for worse, Uribe was the candidate that best represented the interests and hopes of those who, both legally and illegally, opposed FARC and felt that the Pastrana government had failed its constitutional duties. Just as Pastrana was the candidate that best represented the country's desire for peace, ironically enough. So I am not under the illusion that Uribe had a real chance of losing, as much as I would have wished it. If anything, he would have won by a much smaller margin the first time. Should he resign? Morally, probably so. Legally, that depends, again, on what judicial responsibilities are established. Finally, while it is certainly related, the Medina issue is another can of worms.

juancegomez comments on Chavez- Is there reason for the paranoia?

Venezuela has been barking about U.S.-led invasions and other plans for so long, none of which has actually materialized, that I would be surprised if this one was actually true. Unless events prove otherwise, I would be extremely cautious. First off, I'd like to read the entire document myself. Second, Isaías Rodríguez is a former Attorney General. He no longer has any position in the Venezuelan government. When and how exactly did he compile this document that is now being mysteriously presented as part of the Danilo Anderson case? A case in which Mr. Rodriguez has lately been feeling a lot of pressure, due to certain irregularities related to the star witness of the case, while he was acting as a prosecutor. See here: --------------------------------------------------- Witness Says He Was Paid in Venezuela By IAN JAMES – Apr 9, 2008 CARACAS, Venezuela (AP) — A man once considered the star witness in the case of an assassinated prosecutor has recanted testimony that helped convict three men and implicated opponents of President Hugo Chavez. Giovanny Vasquez said in an interview televised Wednesday that he believes the former attorney general, Isaias Rodriguez, was fooled by prosecutors working under him. Vasquez's lawyer, Morly Uzcategui, said Tuesday night that his client knows nothing about the case but testified against suspects after receiving $500,000 in cash from a government official. In Vasquez's interview, which was taped Tuesday and shown on the opposition-leaning channel Globovision, he said the former attorney general was apparently unaware. "I have good faith he didn't have anything to do with it," Vasquez was quoted as saying on Globovision's Web site. Rodriguez responded that the case is being manipulated as part of a U.S.-backed media campaign against Chavez's government, the state-run Bolivarian News Agency reported. Rodriguez said he expects disinformation about the case will be part of a "script" with political aims. Rodriguez once called Vasquez his key witness in the murder of prosecutor Danilo Anderson, who was killed in a 2004 car bombing. Based in part on Vasquez's testimony, a judge convicted three former police officers in 2005 and sent them to prison. The men denied involvement in the killing. Vasquez's testimony also was originally cited as key to cases against other suspects, including banker Nelson Mezerhane, retired Gen. Eugenio Anez Nunez, former police officer Fernando Jesus Moreno Palmar, Cuban-born Salvador Romani and journalist Patricia Poleo, a prominent Chavez critic. In late 2006, authorities froze criminal proceedings against most of the suspects, citing a lack of evidence. No others have been charged in the killing of Anderson, who had been investigating the roles of government opponents in a failed 2002 coup against Chavez. Vasquez presented his new testimony to prosecutors Tuesday. Uzcategui, his lawyer, was quoted by the newspaper El Universal as saying his client "provided evidence showing the (first) investigation... was a montage." The Colombian-born witness went along with it "due to money issues and later due to pressures against him, his relatives and his life," Uzcategui said, according to El Universal. "They delivered $500,000 in cash to Vasquez for having lent his help for this." The source of the alleged payment was unclear, though the lawyer said it came from a Justice Ministry official. Vasquez said he has received threats, and his face was blurred to prevent easy identification in the interview, which Globovision said was taped by Somos, a smaller regional station. In an earlier interview taped in 2006 and released this week, Vasquez mentioned the $500,000 payment, saying he later handed over $200,000 under an agreement with a prosecutor who was taken off the case. Vasquez said he didn't know the main suspects. He also said he was once flown to Venezuela's La Orchila island by the military intelligence agency. His lawyer said Vasquez was there a month "to prepare him" for testifying. While there, Vasquez said he met Chavez, who thanked him personally. "He told me, 'Thank you for helping justice. ... We're here to support you,'" Vasquez said in that interview, according to a summary on Globovision's Web site. Uzcategui said the 2006 interview was among evidence presented to prosecutors. It is unclear why it was not made public previously. Associated Press writers Jorge Rueda and Christopher Toothaker contributed to this report. http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5imI3nBmrQsExJWqbT-dPIe9rLnXgD8VUMI1O2 ----------------- But admittedly, the specifics of the above case aren't relevant. In fact, the Danilo Anderson case would have very little to do with this alleged recent invasion plan. So why bring it up now? Simply citing unknown "(presumably infiltrated or paid off) sources within the DAS", who did not even attend this assumed meeting, is not credible enough to sustain such important accusations. In other words, this story wants us to believe that a former Venezuelan government official, who is now a common citizen, has access to an existing spy apparatus that allowed him to learn of this recent meeting. Why would an Attorney General, let alone a former one, have to deal with spies at all? If this information was real, I would expect to see it being presented by current Venezuelan intelligence or police officials, at the very least, not by a common man as part of an unrelated court case. Finally, to address romy's point...I do not believe that is clear, but I don't see why it should be automatically assumed that Colombia would want to get involved in such a mess.

juancegomez comments on If Uribe was a different guy...

Just want to add a couple of things. A person's past can and should be scrutinized, but I accept that the present should be more important than the past. The thing is, in several situations, like in Uribe's case, you can tell that even the kindest presentation and interpretation of his past is having some effects on his present activities, one way or another. Many of his current allies and friends are tied to his past, the existence of certain skeletons in his closet directly affects Colombia's reputation, and the failure to address certain subjects can also be linked to Uribe's past behavior. It's not like the past is totally disconnected from the present, and I fear that Uribe has not changed enough. Absolutely perfect purity may be a rarity in the political arena, unfortunately, but I do believe that there are enough people who are cleaner than others, and in particular cleaner than Uribe at least. I still don't see why we should tie the struggle against FARC to one person alone, as if we were dealing with some sort of messiah.

juancegomez comments on If Uribe was a different guy...

Same here about that last part, but not the rest. Good night.

juancegomez comments on If Uribe was a different guy...

billyb: The legitimacy of Uribe's coalition is crumbling on an almost weekly basis and I don't see him taking any effective measures to prevent the crisis from ballooning into his third term, the way things are going. The current political reform is a tiny step, and thus it may buy him some time, but it doesn't fix the leak. HIs own personal immunity and resistance can only last for so long, although I continue to believe he has a right to due process, legal presumption of innocence and all that involves. If his own persona crumbles, last but certainly not least, that will not be pretty. I'd at least want to believe some Uribists would be willing to try doing something else, however, and spare us some of the pain. Stubbornness is a powerful double-edged sword, indeed, yet I'd prefer if we didn't depend so much on just one person (and on his own fate) for such an important task. So I guess we'll have to agree to disagree, billyb...we may agree with the ultimate destination, essentially, but we are clearly not reading the same road map even if the two of us do follow some overlapping routes.

juancegomez comments on If Uribe was a different guy...

billyb: Perhaps in some cases, but the same could be said of anyone else who ISN'T Uribe even among his own political coalition, as corrupt as many of them are or are perceived to be, including their own sets of special interests...so does that mean we should keep Uribe as President as long as he's willing to run, even indefinitely if necessary? Don't think so. However, for the record, I'd be perfectly willing to accept a more reasonable and less intolerant Uribist as President, even if I didn't vote for him (or her)...at least at first, anyways. That would in fact be a step in the right direction, and it could allow for further consensus without making you think "oh no, he's a leftist, so he won't do what needs to be done to stop the FARC onslaught". But Uribe again, and while he's still his mostly uncritical and intolerant self? No, not at all. In the meanwhile, I don't want him to fall to a coup or revolt, but I'm not exactly celebrating everything he is doing. Also for the record, I don't think a leftist politician would be able to win at this point without having to make alliances with non-leftists, one way or another, so that should keep things in check at the presidential level. Not to mention that Uribism will likely continue to control Congress and probably other regional posts, so that's one more thing to keep in mind, for better and for worse. Finally, I am not saying that the "FARC issue" should be handled in a *completely* different way, strategically, but there are enough tactical and operational problems worth mentioning (human rights, social bases and so on), their inherent morality aside (but not forgotten), that should be resolved or at least addressed a lot more than what we are now seeing. Do you really think that we can beat FARC without shrinking their remaining social bases through non-military action? Even if Marulanda dies in an attack, or even together with a couple of additional Secretariat members, the structure will remain, even if it has to adapt and disperse. I don't exactly have a magical crystal ball at my side, but I can tell that much.

juancegomez comments on If Uribe was a different guy...

billyb: Leaving aside the fact that the fight against FARC per se could be better handled in several tactical and strategic respects, I'll clearly admit most of his administration's virtues lie there and I recognize the immediate need to continue with its most essential aspects. The thing is, I fear that Uribe himself has compromised those next and potentially critical years you speak of (although I am prepared for a far, far longer struggle, given past precedent) by, precisely, handling his administration rather poorly and excessively linking its success to his own persona. If he would just come out and said, for example, in very explicit and unequivocal terms, that he will not support any further reelection amendments, that he will not run again and that he will support someone else from his party coalition, that would begin to create a far less polarized political environment, with more room for consensus and for elevating the main positive elements of "democratic security" into a real state policy, without alienating and intimidating the opposition. In fact, believe it or not, there are people, even in the Democratic Pole, that agree with the need to keep up the pressure on FARC. You could even say that for some of those in the Liberal Party as well, and I believe most Colombian voters wouldn't be moronic enough to overlook the issue at this point, even if and when the pendulum swings in another direction for various reasons. It's not like everyone in the opposition believes that a duplicate of the Pastrana model is all we need, even if they are still very critical of certain aspects of current security policy. There is a lot of room for consensus, but I believe Uribe has done his best to destroy the bridges and bring out the prophets of apocalypse in order to boost his own ratings. Ironically enough, he may get his wish if events take a nastier turn further down the road, in part because of his own scare tactics. If things were different, we wouldn't be wasting so much time and so many resources with needless (and dangerous, in more than one sense and direction) political theatrics and shadow puppets. FARC will take political advantage (with non-political consequences as well), internally and internationally, of every weakness it identifies, so this much infighting isn't helping on that front. Or how about the whole parapolitics scandal and the paramilitary demobilization process. If Uribe had steered clear of certain persons and certain actions, not just now but during a lot of his earlier political and administrative career, his government wouldn't have such a weak underbelly, even if his own persona currently enjoys the benefits of resistant armor. But all things must come to an end, and the state as a whole doesn't share that armor, especially internationally. In fact, Congress is a complete mess and barely functions right now, and the FTA is pretty much stuck in limbo (admittedly local U.S. concerns also play a role there, but that could have been easier to handle as well). The current crisis may have been inevitable because some of those links would have never gone away, but it could have been handled in a better manner, or with less polarizing and divisive results at least. If the Justice and Peace bill supported by the opposition, way back when, had been approved by the government and voted into law by Congress, that would have been a step in the right direction, for example. That bill wasn't too different from what we ended up getting (thanks to the Constitutional Court), but the key element we now lack was there: consensus. The way I see it, Uribe may be "borrando con el codo lo que escribe con la mano" (literally "erasing with his elbow what he is writing with his hand"). I really, really hope that things turn out OK, either way...but I can't help but think that Uribe has messed up way too much. Just because FARC may be "a priority" doesn't mean that there aren't better ways of addressing the issue, or that his administration's flaws can be justified for the sake of a struggle they may even be hurting.

juancegomez comments on If Uribe was a different guy...

He's certainly incredibly popular, and at least partially with good reason, but that's not necessarily a good thing. Even for his own administration. I fear it may have gotten to his head, and that's why he's so reluctant to accept criticism, since he knows he can always appeal to the audience for backup. Sometimes it's necessary to be critical of one's own actions, and Uribe has shown too little of that. And what's more, despite that popularity, he stills holds onto the electoral barons, no matter the costs...if not for his own good, then for the country's sake, he could have distanced himself from them and enacted comprehensive reforms (and not just those in the 2003 referendum, in case you bring that up), precisely because of his popular support. But he has chosen not to, and we know how things turned out. His administration depends on an uneven mix of populism and clientelism, that may well prove to be formidable while a certain degree of stability lasts, but may not survive future debacles...especially since political polarization hasn't been prevented and, on the contrary, Uribe himself (and, to be fair, some of his most virulent opponents as well) has fed it.

juancegomez comments on Very complete report to understand: Colombia’s New Armed Groups

robi666: I understand your point, but you know that even if the two main sponsors are out of the game, they may have rivals or subordinates that may (or may not) have less money, individually, but could still finance at least some continuation of their activities. Even if many of the "mandos medios" are out of the game, which is a good thing, I don't believe all of them are, or that there aren't rival organizations willing to try and pick up the slack, imperfectly or otherwise.

juancegomez comments on Very complete report to understand: Colombia’s New Armed Groups

The question would be if the group(s) can still survive, regardless of the loss of the two "Mellizos". Their subordinates may not want to retire so soon, after all...so I think billyb's onto something there, as far as the "little wars" are concerned.

juancegomez comments on If Uribe was a different guy...

Further changes may well make it a possibility, but not right now. For better or for worse, I fear that a coup (either against Uribe or a Fujimori-style move on his part) would only make things that much more chaotic and potentially even more polarized (or it could backfire...Venezuela in 2002, anyone?), so for all our problems I am relieved at the fact such a development seems to be unlikely at this point, as it has been during most of our history. A rather conflicted and tragic history, to pick up on part of what Desi has said, but not without steps forward as well as, unfortunately but naturally, steps back. On the other hand, I could well see Uribe failing to end his term if there is a solid investigation that incriminates him in an undeniable crime, but not because of any coup or revolt. Recent events may be foreshadowing such a thing, but I prefer to be patient, especially since there is still no smoking gun. Even the whole Yidis case, as dangerous as it may be, seems to have a few cracks that the Courts will have to sort out. In the meanwhile...Uribe's "miracles" are overrated, but I wouldn't say that Colombians are dumb either. Even if we may tend to be very individualistic and even worryingly indifferent to the pain of others, or not as caring as one would want, I don't believe that a lot of those people who loyally support Uribe don't have valid reasons to do so. The overall picture is quite mixed, with some very good signs but also some very horrible ones, but there are enough good parts that might make some people reach a pro-Uribe conclusion, at least in the short term. Just as some of us can reach a different one, because our interests, ideas or priorities may differ, or because we think the medium and long term consequences of the situation may make short term "miracles" pyhrric. Stability is a difficult thing to argue against, unless and until there is something that breaks it. Even in purely political terms, Uribe has managed to isolate himself from the negative effects of the parapolitical scandal and, rather incredibly I might add, some people justify his faults because of the difficulty of his task. Not only in terms of corruption (where the image of an honest king surrounded by evil retainers comes to mind), but also in far more deadly fields. Union murders are definitely up, and are unfortunately going to be higher than 2007's, which is indeed a worrying development. Even if it may still be a relatively low number, unless the increase goes all the way up to 50, 60, 70 or more, it's a sign of intolerance and indifference, as well as showing the limits of the government's policies and their failure to close off the door to bloodshed. That is shameful enough, but Uribe is pretty much immune to any *internal* political flak from it. Finally, how will we get out of the current crisis? I am not sure, but can speculate a bit. If Uribe does make it to the end of the his term, I believe that most of the fallout will blow up in our faces only afterwards, but that may well give us a chance to rebuild our institutions after all. If there is a second reelection, all bets are off but I don't think the result will be pretty either. In fact, that could be the worst scenario (or one of the worst, at least...outside of a FARC victory or something like that). I'm not certain if the opposition will be able to win in 2010, although that is my personal wish...certainly not if Uribism either presents an unified candidacy (somewhat difficult but not impossible) or if Uribe himself enters the game (if he can, that is).

juancegomez comments on Venezuelan Army completes anti-paramilitary operation

I agree with Mr. Hollywood, unsurprisingly in this case.

juancegomez comments on FARC Kidnaps A Top American Terrorist

Whether this guy's activities are terrorist or not, I ignore that not being an expert or even an amateur on the subject, kidnappings are still a big no no. Even if the victims are not saints or are also criminal.

juancegomez comments on Breaking news: Abatido uno de los hermanos Mejía Múnera, jefes de la banda de Los Mellizos

So I guess the two are essentially out of business. Too bad that won't bring down the business itself, but well...that's the ultimate problem.

juancegomez comments on ELN propone asamblea constituyente

At least this is a mostly political and peaceful solution, however.

juancegomez comments on Macabra orden de asesinato contra investigadores sociales

Totalmente macabra y totalmente necesario rechazarla.

juancegomez comments on Very complete report to understand: Colombia’s New Armed Groups

I think there's no easy or single answer. I'd argue that most of the impunity people have come to associate with the conflict or with the country is a relatively contemporary consequence. Why? Because the larger part of that impunity is less than 30-20 years old. If you look at arrest or conviction rates before the 1980s, while they weren't exactly admirable and there were certainly unresolved or unopposed murders, things were actually much better in general terms. Yes, even after the mid-century "La Violencia", considering that situation had largely settled down by then. If large amounts of impunity (not just "political" but also "common" impunity, which is actually the bigger problem statistically speaking) have been increasingly absorbed and accepted by society after two or three decades, one has to understand that it has been an evolving part of a historical process and that it has been affected by other factors. The rise of the illegal drug trade and its consequences, for example. While it was not the source of Colombia's violence nor of its other problems, it did clearly accelerate and intensify many of them.I'd say that the current levels of impunity would have been hard to expect, let alone imagine, without it. In short, I think culture ("of impunity" and otherwise) can and has been affected by circumstance, not just vice versa, and it can and will happen again. Whether that will be an improvement or a further degeneration of the situation is hard to tell.

juancegomez comments on Uribe disregards recognizing the political status of FARC

It's a matter of internal recognition. The Colombian government has internally, according to its own laws, been able to recognize the guerrilla groups as political movements and valid political counterparts for negotiations. Belligerence has never been explicitly or formally recognized, whether internally or internationally. See here for examples: Miércoles, 07.06.2000. Colombia: gobierno devuelve estatus político al ELN http://www.bbc.co.uk/spanish/news/news000607colombia.shtml El Pais (Colombia) Febrero 21 de 2002 Las Farc quedaron sin estatus político http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/farc/estatus.htm

juancegomez comments on Uribe disregards recognizing the political status of FARC

I can look for the posts tomorrow, but it's more or less along the lines of what was mentioned in this article: --------------------------- Enero 14 de 2008 Qué es y qué repercusiones tiene el Estatus de Beligerancia Blog: ¿Debe una palabra se interponerse en la esperanza de los secuestrados? A partir de las recientes declaraciones del presidente Venezolano Hugo Chávez de quitarle el grado de terroristas y otorgarles el estatus de beligerancia a las guerrillas de las Farc y el Eln, Terra Colombia ha querido hacer claridad sobre las repercusiones de dicha propuesta. En términos de derecho internacional, se trata de una figura que le permite a una facción armada no gubernamental, si cumple determinadas condiciones de mando, estructura, control territorial y respeto a las normas mínimas de la guerra, obtener apoyo y reconocimiento externo, lo que le da derecho, incluso, a tener voceros diplomáticos y apoyo financiero. Para entender mejor este tema y sus implicaciones, es necesario definir el concepto de beligerancia. El Estatus de beligerancia, en su acepción más simple, consiste en atribuir la importancia suficiente para contender con él. Sin embargo, el uso del concepto depende del carácter del conflicto armado en el cual se aplique. La Beligerancia es una figura que tiene por finalidad conferir a una de las Partes en un conflicto armado (interno o internacional) un estatus especial por medio del cual, sin que sea necesario reconocerle personería jurídica, el Estado que lo reconoce como tal, tácita o expresamente, establece relaciones comerciales, semidiplomáticas, diplomáticas, políticas o económicas con la Parte reconocida. Ese reconocimiento lo puede hacer el gobierno del Estado escenario de la confrontación, aunque no es usual, por sus posibles repercusiones (cambio del gobierno y hasta desmembración territorial del Estado). Los efectos de conceder a un grupo la beligerancia son políticos, jurídicos, militares y estratégicos. Equivale a decir, en términos prácticos, que en el Estado que sufre el conflicto hay dos gobiernos: uno de derecho y otro de facto que controla parte del territorio y ejerce autoridad en él. Ese gobierno local de facto empieza a ser sujeto del derecho internacional y por ello, puede mantener relaciones con los gobiernos y entidades que lo reconocieron y ser tratado en igualdad de condiciones con el gobierno legítimo. Mientras tanto, el Estatus de beligerancia, en su acepción más simple, consiste en atribuirle a una de las partes del conflicto la importancia suficiente para contender con él. Sin embargo, el uso del concepto depende del carácter del conflicto armado en el cual se aplique. Un grupo beligerante, es aquel grupo de población de un Estado que se alza en lucha armada contra un orden constitucional legal y vigente establecido. En el derecho internacional, para que se pueda hablar de Movimiento beligerante reconocido (comunidad beligerante, grupo beligerante), es imprescindible que se le otorgue el reconocimiento jurídico internacional por parte de otros sujetos del sistema jurídico internacional, además de reunir las siguientes condiciones: - Dominio real y efectivo de una parte considerable del territorio del Estado. - Constitución de un aparato político-militar. - Aplicación irrestricta de las normas del Derecho Internacional Humanitario. Los Movimientos de beligerancia reconocidos tienen como condición imprescindible para su existencia el haber recibido el reconocimiento jurídico internacional por parte de Estados o de organizaciones internacionales gubernamentales y se clasifican en: Movimientos de liberación nacional (que combaten contra un régimen colonial, un régimen racista o una ocupación extranjera), Nación beligerante (un pueblo que en virtud del principio de autodeterminación busca a través de las armas el reconocimiento de pertenencia de un territorio y el derecho a constituir un gobierno autónomo y soberano), grupo beligerante (grupo de población de un Estado que se alza en lucha armada contra un orden constitucional legal y vigente establecido). Otro de los términos que es importante aclara en una discusión de este tipo es el de estatus político, que es el reconocimiento que el Presidente de la República hace a un grupo alzado en armas con el fin de establecer o iniciar negociaciones. En Colombia, la ley 782 de 2002 no exige de dicho reconocimiento para la negociación con un grupo armado ilegal. La figura del Estatus político no está consagrada en el Derecho Internacional Humanitario y no es sinónimo de beligerancia. Algunas reacciones Para el ex procurador Jaime Bernal Cuellar ha precisado las consecuencias de la petición de otorgarle a las Farc el estatus de beligerancia y afirmó que a nivel internacional podría permitir una mayor facilidad de presencia y de posibles diálogos como ocurría antes de haberlos incluido en la lista de terroristas. El politólogo y analista León valencia considera que con esa propuesta, el presidente Hugo Chávez está actuando como vocero de una reivindicación que han pedido las Farc desde hace algunos años, que se puede leer en el reconocimiento político que han pedido tras la liberación de los secuestrados. “Chávez se hace vocero de una reivindicación de las Farc que era la reivindicación principal del intercambio humanitario; es que el intercambio humanitario y la zona de despeje que han pedido las Farc están ligados a un reconocimiento político nacional e internacional que querían obtener y yo creo que aquí Chávez se hace vocero de esa reivindicación y de otra que es que los saquen de la lista de terroristas�?. Para el ex ministro y miembro de la Comisión Nacional de Conciliación Augusto Ramírez Ocampo cree que los hechos terroristas de las Farc hablan por sí solos, de tal forma que otorgarles el estatus de beligerancia sería descabellado. “Absurdo; va contra al naturaleza de las cosas porque es bien sabido que en el escenario mundial, una organización armada que utiliza prácticas terroristas como por ejemplo el uso de armas indiscriminadas, las minas personales, lo cilindros de gas y las bombas no merece que les quiten el nombre de terroristas�?. Terra Colombia http://www.terra.com.co/actualidad/articulo/html/acu7892.htm

juancegomez comments on Detalles del testimonio que involucra a Uribe con masacre

romy: Even if that is the case, that hardly confirms the actual truth or falsehood of the matter. I am not in favor of reelection, but I don't want it to be derailing using any and all imaginable means, no matter the cost. In other words, I think that even if Uribe played dirty in order to get himself reelected, we shouldn't play dirty in order to prevent any alleged reelection attempts. That's a rather Pyhrric victory. Honestly, I hope investigators take a close look at what his original declarations said, ten years ago, and compare them with this newest round of revelations, to see if they are consistent or not. Contradictory testimonies need to be explained, or else they will lose credibility. It's possible that this paramilitary fighter could be right about Uribe's involvement, knowledge or tolerance, even if he's wrong about many details. But he shouldn't get a free pass. Semana has a list of possible or apparent inconsistencies: --------------- SEMANA habló con Villalba. Esta son algunas de sus inconsistencias. 1. Villalba dice que en la reunión estuvieron los generales Manosalva y Ospina. Para la fecha de la reunión Manosalva había muerto y sólo después de su muerte Ospina llegó a la IV Brigada, procedente del Meta. Al preguntarle por esta inconsistencia, Villalba aseguró que había una reunión de la cúpula militar y por eso asistieron varios generales. 2. Nunca antes en el proceso Villalba había mencionado ni la reunión con Uribe, ni la liberación de los supuestos secuestrados. Habida cuenta que su condena se produjo hace más de cinco años ¿por qué no ofreció en su momento esta información a cambio de rebaja de pena, y ahora lo hace con ese objetivo? 3. Villalba no es reconocido por las víctimas de la masacre como alguien con alto rango en las autodefensas. De hecho comandaba, según su propio testimonio, a 22 hombres. Difícilmente alguien de tan baja jerarquía en la organización criminal sería testigo de una reunión tan delicada como la que plantea. 4. Si bien Villalba ha sido un testigo clave y de probada veracidad en algunos procesos por masacres, su testimonio también ha sido inconsistente en casos como el de Jaime Garzón. ¿Qué busca Villalba al dar esta versión diez años después, a pesar de haber sido testigo en decenas de procesos? ¿Por qué su declaración sale en este momento? Esas son preguntas que la Fiscalía tendrá que indagar. En todo caso, esto como todos los testimonios que llegan a manos de los investigadores seguramente será verificado y compulsadas las copias que haya lugar. También queda la duda de por qué el Presidente resolvió salir públicamente a defenderse de unas acusaciones de un convicto, a las hasta ahora nadie les había dado mayor importancia. http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?IdArt=111223

juancegomez comments on Protest Threats against Colombian Defender and her Family

As sad as even having to talk about this is...exile isn't the best solution, but if things have in fact reached such a level of imminent threat...moving to another city and, if possible, out of the country is extremely reasonable.

juancegomez comments on Paramilitaries threaten priest who runs community radio station

Everyone who makes equivalent threats deserves as much scorn as possible, including but not limited to the paramilitaries or people close to them, and the victims deserve attention and protection.

juancegomez comments on The Adventure of Going to School in Colombia

Horrible que haya seres humanos que tengan que sufrir este tipo de situaciones, sin que el gobierno local, regional o nacional haga lo que tiene que hacer.

juancegomez comments on Entrevista a Salvatore Mancuso

buggy: Believe it or not, the whole "transitional government" thing isn't that new...I remember reading about it one year ago, at least. Although nobody in particular was mentioned. Should look that up sometime. Smoke curtains can also contain grains (or even fields) of truth, even if they can also be made up of exaggerations and distortions, if not outright lies. I believe Córdoba's not being treated fairly or even decently, to say the least, but that doesn't mean that everything should be dismissed. As for Mancuso...I don't know what's worse: if he's telling all of the truth, only a part of it, a bunch of lies...or if his goal is to taint as much people as possible in order to force a full pardon (if everyone is guilty, nobody is guilty).

juancegomez comments on Colombia: Rebels tried to kill Uribe

cali373: It only "takes away" somethingt if you believe that a human being's memory is exclusively short-term and can't handle the discussion of very different subjects. A dozen stories about non-parapolitics issues don't erase parapolitics, nor vice versa.

juancegomez comments on Colombian government to 'repair' (lives) of 200k victims and 2.2m displaced individuals

I somehow missed this topic, so posting here as a kind of "bookmark" (won't abuse it).

juancegomez comments on Colombia's Uribe under probe over 1997 massacre

The accusations are very serious, but extraordinary claims (and mentioning Uribe now, when this paramilitary was already in jail ten years ago and had made many previous declarations about the same massacre, is rather out of the ordinary) need extraordinary evidence. Let those who should investigate do their job. Personally, I'm mentally prepared to accept either outcome (the guy is lying or he isn't).

juancegomez comments on Uribe disregards recognizing the political status of FARC

Belligerence and political status are not equivalent. Even if the press tends to confuse the two. I support using a more diplomatic language, including the recognition of political status (which even Pastrana, Samper and others already did), but not (without going into the details, previously discussed several months ago) that of FARC as a belligerent (which has not been officially and formally done to date, ever). That is a bit more complicated, to say the least, depending on its consequences and the context surrounding it.

juancegomez comments on Pandora's Box- Alleged information (links) from Reyes' computer is discredited by 'Leftist' Academics

I think the headline is very misleading, as Mr. Hollywood pointed out. There is no OAS Secretariat, only a Secretary General. It's a rather big mistake, to say the least, to claim that this is a letter by "members of the OAS Secretariat", as romy appears to have misunderstood. Looking at who these people are, essentially university academics who feel the need to send a "open letter", should make that clear enough. Since when do official members of the OAS need to send "open letters"? That's usually what activists do, not officials. I think that someone is mixing things up here. Yes, the OAS Secretary General (note the huge difference) did -separately- mention that even if the documents do exist and even if they did belong to "Raúl Reyes", that doesn't automatically prove every accusation or, of course, confirm the interpretations and exaggerations that have been derived from said documents. I can agree with that, in principle, as I do believe that the Colombian government has exaggerated or outright lied, in at least some cases. But you know something? I *also* think that the individuals who signed this letter are also ignoring certain parts of the letters and documents, trying to interpret them in a way that favors their own ideological or political positions. I could copy and paste other parts of the documents that mention the "dossier" or related terms, for example, and ask why they are only referencing just *one* passage. Is that any better than what the Colombian government has done? No. In other words, it's not just one side who is playing political games here. Both sides are, and they are all jeopardizing the truth, whatever it is. But all that hardly makes the PCs useless and the information in the documents, if they are in fact real, could help find actual evidence, sooner or later. Even if the text does not prove any of the accusations, obviously, it can narrow the search. If I find a message saying that someone hid a bunch of dollars in Costa Rica, that alone isn't proof. Nobody should think so. But what if I investigate and do find that money in Costa Rica? Then there is actual evidence, to use one easy example. Others may be less direct, but the logic is there. That doesn't mean that everything in the Colombian government's interpretation is true (in fact, I believe they may have hurt their own case by reaching conclusions and making accusations far too quickly and sloppily). But I'm not going to shameless assume the political position that, unfortunately, these academics appear to consider as a better alternative. Un mal no excusa otro mal. Btw, it's true the Interpol report is not available yet. And that's why there is no way to claim that Interpol has already "discredited" anything at this point, so that headline (in Spanish) from the Venezuelan News Agency is quite flawed and partisan. If anyone wants to take it seriously, that is, at least the description should be more accurate. robi666: I mentioned April as the estimated deadline sometime ago, because there were sources which said so at the time. Want me to quote? The date has been moved to May, as indicated in the link you have posted, but I didn't just make that up. I read it in several places when I made that post.Sorry for not being active enough to correct that, but I'm busy these days (yes, busier than I look like, given this post's length).

juancegomez comments on Detalles del testimonio que involucra a Uribe con masacre

Very serious, and also very interesting, but one wonders...why didn't this guy mention Uribe before? He's been in jail for quite a while and had already made declarations about the massacre since at least 1998, not just recently. I wonder how many people know that. Why does he only make declarations against Uribe ten years later, all of a sudden? Either he suddenly decided it was "the right moment", for reasons I can' t fathom, or he's lying for unknown purposes. Either way, it's not pretty, and the -at least- two inconsistencies in his later testimony are worrying. See here: http://www.hrw.org/spanish/informes/2000/colombia_lazos2.html

juancegomez comments on El computador de Raul Reyes es la caja de Pandora que Bush ha regalado a Colombia

Even if I wasn't too busy to do so, this isn't worth replying to. Too much rhetoric and too little reasoning. I am waiting for Interpol, thank you very much, to give its report. Even that only solves part of the problem, either way, but it should make the debate far more productive than exchanging insults, educated or otherwise.

juancegomez comments on News: the cousin of president Uribe tries to escape Colombian justice!

Yes, his request was apparently denied. I wonder if he'll go elsewhere or if he'll manage to get himself arrested. Jorgegdiaz...I suppose you're saying that because of the FARC camp survivors, no?

juancegomez comments on News: the cousin of president Uribe tries to escape Colombian justice!

Yes, I just posted a topic about this minutes ago, although with a different headline. Not a problem, however. And that's all from me for now...real life calls.

juancegomez comments on Former Congresswoman denounces benefits offered in exchange for approving reelection bill

I missed your posting it, especially if it wasn't on Politics & War...and you probably posted it a few hours before the video was transmitted on TV. I did it afterwards. No big deal.