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Uribe vs. the Drug Thugs

From today's WSJ

Uribe vs. the Drug Thugs

To get an idea of how long Afghanistan's war against narco-trafficking terrorists could last, the Colombian experience with criminals of a similar ilk might be instructive -- though not encouraging. That thought occurred to me after an interview with Colombian President Álvaro Uribe in New York last week.

Mr. Uribe may be the most clear-thinking, courageous ally in the war on terror that the U.S. has in Latin America, and Washington has spent billions of dollars trying to eradicate coca plants in his country. That is to say, there has been no lack of political will in the fight against drug thugs in Colombia. If other world leaders have gone wobbly on fighting terrorism, Mr. Uribe has not. "Under no circumstances will the government weaken its policy on democratic security," he told me emphatically last week.

But as the popular president begins his second four-year term, his challenges are daunting. While it is true that guerrilla kidnappings and killings are down sharply since he instituted his policy of "democratic security" in 2002, it is also true that Colombians have rising expectations of the man who did so much in his first term to push back the terrorists and restore Colombian confidence. The trouble is that, despite these efforts, the persistent demand for illicit cocaine from the U.S. and Europe is still feeding an organized-crime network that has little incentive to take up honest work. Drug-financed terrorism remains a constant drain on resources and an impediment to Colombian development.

Mr. Uribe put the Sisyphean task ahead of him clearly when I asked about progress in the war on drugs: "Colombia is a great ally of the U.S. In spraying, extradition, forfeiture of assets and manual eradication we have done our best. However, in relation to our efforts, we need better results." In other words, despite copious amounts of Colombian blood, sweat and tears, the reality of demand for a high-priced commodity keeps the goal to end supply out of reach.

The most immediate challenge facing the president involves the fate of 62 kidnap victims now held by the drug-trafficking Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In recent weeks the FARC has turned up the pressure on Mr. Uribe to agree to an exchange of 500 FARC operatives held by the government for the 62 kidnap victims, some of whom have been hostages for years. The guerrilla objectives are clear: A good number of the FARC prisoners are important mid-level commandantes whom the organization needs.

To boost public support for an exchange, the FARC has been releasing video tapes of the hostages to the Colombian media. Relatives of the hostages are then filmed, tears streaming down their faces as they view their loved ones held captive.

It has long been the policy of the Uribe government that any prisoner release must be carried out in accordance with the law and that any prisoner who is freed must agree to lay down arms. So I asked Mr. Uribe whether he would negotiate with the guerrillas. "I have expressed my willingness to open negotiations under conditions of good faith," he told me. "So far we have no negotiations but given good faith, we would talk."

This seems, at first, a departure from the standard views of a hard-liner on terrorism. But in fact it is a continuation of his hope for reconciliation, a hope that Mr. Uribe has held since I first interviewed him in 1997, when he was governor of the Colombian state of Antioquia. That hope may be even greater today because of the success the government has had in bringing so many of the lawless in from the cold. It is a record he is proud of. "At this moment we have completed the demobilization of 40,000 [individuals]," he says. "Over 7,000 came from the guerrillas and over 30,000 were [in the paramilitary]. There is no previous comparison [of these results]. When Colombia had the demobilization of the [former rebel group] M-19, there were 900 people [demobilized]. This is the biggest guerrilla demobilization in our history."

Despite Mr. Uribe's hope, though, if the government sticks to its policy that freed prisoners must renounce violence, not much is likely to happen. The FARC wants the swap so it can regroup. Moreover, on the subject of a broader peace negotiation, FARC leadership seems to think it can play the same game it played with previous governments, pretending to want peace so as to gain a safe haven for its businesses in arms, drugs and kidnapping. That much comes through in an open letter from FARC leaders sent to the three branches of government on Oct. 2. The letter details the conditions that the FARC demands for peace talks, "once the swap [of prisoners for kidnapping victims] is completed."

At the top of the list is the demilitarization of the coca growing states of Caquetá and Putumayo, followed by the suspension of orders to the military for the capture of FARC leadership, and an army withdrawal to its barracks. As if those demands weren't ridiculous enough, the letter goes on to say that the government must make an appeal to the international community to stop referring to the FARC as terrorists. Tell that to the 12-year-old girl who lost her leg, her parents and her four-year-old sister in the FARC attack on Club Nogal in Bogotá in 2003. That bombing, aimed at innocent civilians, killed 35 people and injured more than 170. It is a good example of why polls in Colombia put public support for the FARC at 1%.

Mr. Uribe understands that in addition to being open to talks and pushing security, he also has to show that he is responsive to political, economic and social problems. In our interview he stressed judicial reforms under his government, including the introduction of an oral-trial system similar to what is used in the U.S., an increase in judicial independence and the transfer of more legal cases against the military to civilian court jurisdiction. He also emphasized the importance of boosting economic growth, although he has already tripped on this issue by allowing a bold tax reform -- designed to stimulate investment by cutting and simplifying taxes -- to be perverted by special interests. Analysts are now warning that if Mr. Uribe is smart, he will pull the bill rather than let it further damage Colombia's investment profile.

Still, his biggest problem remains security, and it is hard to imagine real progress unless the demand for illegal drugs collapses in Europe and the U.S., or rich countries change their prohibition policies.

By tejasmarcos on Oct 13, 2006, 19:05 in Politics & the war.

adrimm (☼Travelguide writer) says on Oct 14, 2006, 00:19:

I was thinking about the parallels myself after reading about the increases in popppy and heroin there a few months ago.

Of course it is little bit different in Afghanistan becuase the fundamentalist groups actually helped suppress the drug trade. Regardless, once consumer markets become addicted/established they will have the same problem that Colombia has with drug trade. I think that this is the time that countries that are potential markets for the extra heroin need to really really step up with drug-addictions education and anti-drug campaigns.

Those aren't the only similarities tho. I heard the mayor of Kabul speak over the summer and poor guy.. so many problems - the population of Kabul has doubled in the last decade with displaced people, with several hundred thousand in only the last few years.

Providing basic services is impossible - and unlike Colombia they have winter to contend with there.

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miamimike says on Oct 14, 2006, 01:15:

I think plan Colombia is a Failure,,, after Billions of Dollars over several years, Cocaine production and Quality is up in Colombia, prices are down in the USA Streets are down due to increased product and a purer product,,,

Avatar Legend: Bush "If any of you Reporters are wondering, it was a Size 10"

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vladimiro says on Oct 14, 2006, 07:42:

Another important difference I think is that there are tens of thousand of US and foriegn troops in Afghanistan in the immediate vicinity of the poppy fields and they do nothing to stop drug production. In fact, its almost as if they were guarding the poppy fields for the drug dealers they are aligned with in the government.

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tejasmarcos says on Oct 14, 2006, 09:22:

there must always be "a drug war". without it, political agendas and vote gathering suffer.

trying to walk a straight line on sour mash and cheap wine...

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Sr Tertius says on Oct 14, 2006, 10:59:

Buscando al muerto rio arriba So, first it was Novak and now is this unnamed WSJ editorialist (Well, at least PBH is back from Caracas). What’s the problem with these people? “Oh! Lookie! Colombia looks like Afghanistan, only less bad!” Jeepers, sheriff, you have your newly-discovered world map upside down.

Armed insurgencies are not the monopoly of a few countries: From Russia to the Philippines, from Nicaragua to Sri Lanka, people find it necessary to organize and arm themselves. Their motivations are as varied as the countries, but their funding methods are very similar: They either get support from sympathizers, or engage in illegal trade, or both. Because of their motivations, FARC/ELN/AUC are as comparable to the Taliban as the Copa Mustang is comparable to the Roland Garros. If the editorialist just figured out that both insurgencies are financed by illegal trade and thinks of that as a meaningful connection, maybe journalism was the wrong vocational choice.

The editorialist also takes for granted one thing that is highly controversial: That Uribe—or the Colombian government represented by him—is “fighting” a security problem. A bit of historical background, or just watching the latest news, suggests that the succeeding regimes in Colombia have been part of the problem, and the Uribe administration has demonstrated to be no exception. “Courageous,” maybe. Although his words—which the editorialist takes with not a hint of criticism—suggest far more valor and commitment to the US agenda than his actions demonstrate: Just look at him accommodating to the paramilitaries. “Clear thinking?” Not under normal parameters of rationality.

“Colombians have rising expectations of the man who did so much in his first term to push back the terrorists and restore Colombian confidence.” Really? Like the expectation of not manufacturing military successes and killing civilians in the process? Such high expectations! I have an alternative hypothesis: The so-called “democratic security” policy—as so many people expected right after Caguan—was a failure. It wasted 4+ years in a useless and costly war, and put us back, in terms of security, to the pre-Pastrana years. I have to admit, I thought it would take longer, but apparently it will not hold water for more than one or two more years. The reason for its failure is that it assumes what the editorialist states: “Drug-financed terrorism remains a constant drain on resources and an impediment to Colombian development," which is only partially true. A combination of conditions that favor illegal trade, insurgencies, and submission to the US drug-obsessed agenda are the real impediments. If we get rid of drugs and FARC tomorrow, we’ll probably have weapons or money laundry and baby-FARCs to deal with the day after. The truly Sisyphean problem of looking for the corpse upstream.

More problems: The editoralist forgets that prior exchanges with FARC have been done, successfully and satisfactory to all parts, including public opinion. The expectations of “standard views of a hard-liner on terrorism” are infantile and unrealistic. Pressure for the exchange has come not only from FARC, but from inside the political establishment and sizeable sectors of public opinion. Maybe they are all brain-washed by FARC propaganda, but to be honest, I don’t think the FARC guys are that good with PR. Like with the failure of Uribe’s agenda, the answer lies somewhere else.

“That hope may be even greater today because of the success the government has had in bringing so many of the lawless in from the cold.” Nevermind that some of them were ALREADY in jail.

“The guerrilla objectives are clear…” “The FARC wants the swap so it can regroup.” Did the editorialist get these insights from interviewing anyone in the FARC secretariat? No, he read them as implied in the FARC’s latest communique. Clearly, he hasn’t read many of those. He seems ignorant not only of the Colombian process but of negotiations in ANY conflict. For instance, the editorialist goes on an outrage frenzy with the “ridiculous demands” in the communique, as if the initial demands in a negotiation are precisely what is expected to be obtained. The Uribe administration knows better—it asks for something as ridiculous as giving up FARC militancy after release. If you’ve seen one of these before, you know that in a successful negotiation both parties will settle for much less.

Also, “FARC leadership seems to think it can play the same game it played with previous governments, pretending to want peace so as to gain a safe haven for its businesses in arms, drugs and kidnapping…,” and not a word about the game the Pastrana government played…? How convenient, no?

And the grand finale: “Still, his biggest problem remains security.” No. To quote James Carville: “It’s the economy, stupid.”

My conclusion: The editorialist is either a partially-informed moron, or a shameless mouthpiece of those supporting Uribe in the US.

P.S. "Uribe vs the Drug Thugs"? And Platano is accused of misleading headlines...

"When the finger points to the moon, the fool looks at the finger" (Chinese proverb)

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Mr. Hollywood says on Oct 14, 2006, 15:37:

My wish for the day Is that those in power would begin to differentiate between the "drug war" and the need for improved security in Colombia.

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juancegomez says on Oct 15, 2006, 14:33:

SrTertius Though I agree with some of your comments, I naturally also disagree with others...

"If the editorialist just figured out that both insurgencies are financed by illegal trade and thinks of that as a meaningful connection, maybe journalism was the wrong vocational choice."

Probably, but then again that's why we should all try to read as many different sources as possible, shouldn't we?

"A bit of historical background, or just watching the latest news, suggests that the succeeding regimes in Colombia have been part of the problem, and the Uribe administration has demonstrated to be no exception."

To an extent that is the case, but let's be strict for a minute: they have also tried to fight it, rightly or wrongly, and like it or not, the problem looks better today than 10 or 20 years ago, IMHO.

"Just look at him accommodating to the paramilitaries."

Well, last I checked you're supposed to accommodate undefeated groups made up of criminals that you expect to peacefully lay down (at least some of) their arms, whether they are "paracos" or "guerrillos".

The specifics could have been far better, in many ways that have been endlessly mentioned in the Colombian and foreign press, but the general idea of some sort of "accomodation" was necessary, Uribe or no Uribe. Morally questionable, perhaps, but pragmatically necessary.

"Really? Like the expectation of not manufacturing military successes and killing civilians in the process?"

That's a good point, as far as moral expectations go, but do you really think that this is in "innovation" of the current era? That it had never happened before in Colombia? Even the guerrillas themselves admit that this didn't start with Uribe (and it won't end immediately after he's out, unfortunately).

It's still reprehensible, very, but the structural problem within the security forces that lies behind such instances goes back much further than that.

"The so-called “democratic security” policy—as so many people expected right after Caguan—was a failure. It wasted 4+ years in a useless and costly war, and put us back, in terms of security, to the pre-Pastrana years."

The original expectation itself was unachievable, but unfortunately, I must still disagree on this. Regardless of all the continuing problems, I honestly don't see how Colombia is back to pre-Pastrana levels of insecurity and I don't believe that you've made the case for it here either.

It is not enough, clearly, it has had both positive and negative effects, and ultimately different policies must be employed for any significant gains to be consolidated and expanded. But that doesn't make it all a failure. Merely an incomplete, somewhat flawed and potentially temporary success, IMHO.

" A combination of conditions that favor illegal trade, insurgencies, and submission to the US drug-obsessed agenda are the real impediments. If we get rid of drugs and FARC tomorrow, we’ll probably have weapons or money laundry and baby-FARCs to deal with the day after. The truly Sisyphean problem of looking for the corpse upstream."

I agree that describing the conflict in the author's terms is inaccurate and simplistic, but we probably wouldn't always agree on the exact diagnosis of the corpse.

"The editoralist forgets that prior exchanges with FARC have been done, successfully and satisfactory to all parts, including public opinion."

Yup.

"Pressure for the exchange has come not only from FARC, but from inside the political establishment and sizeable sectors of public opinion."

Agreed.

"For instance, the editorialist goes on an outrage frenzy with the “ridiculous demands” in the communique, as if the initial demands in a negotiation are precisely what is expected to be obtained."

That's indeed one of the things that negotiators are expected to keep in mind, once they sit down and actually talk, but the author isn't entirely incorrect in the sense that FARC does expect to get both political and military advantages out of this (and, yes, so does the government).

"The Uribe administration knows better—it asks for something as ridiculous as giving up FARC militancy after release. If you’ve seen one of these before, you know that in a successful negotiation both parties will settle for much less."

It may be wishful thinking, but what he asked them was to stop participating in criminal activities. They could very well engage in pro-FARC or anti-government activities of some sort that do not require breaking the law, especially from outside the country (a possibility that the government has accepted). The line is hard to draw, in practice, but strictly speaking they don't need to renounce membership in FARC or their political beliefs per se.

Of course, that's still relatively unrealistic. The chances of that happening are slim and may be limited to only a small % of those who would be released, in either case.

"...and not a word about the game the Pastrana government played…? How convenient, no?"

Indeed, but all things considered, Pastrana did a much better job at playing it, especially from an international point of view, than the FARC.

Not to mention that FARC's game, IMHO, was the worst of the two, for us Colombians.

"No. To quote James Carville: “It’s the economy, stupid.”"

The economy may be first, but it's followed by security, which remains in second place and is hardly something that we can take for granted.

"My conclusion: The editorialist is either a partially-informed moron, or a shameless mouthpiece of those supporting Uribe in the US."

That seems like it, all things considered, but even shameless mouthpieces (whoever they are supporting) say one or two useful things, once in a while.

"P.S. "Uribe vs the Drug Thugs"? And Platano is accused of misleading headlines..."

Heh, I agree, though probably not for the same reason....

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Cali2005 says on Oct 15, 2006, 15:18:

What is the core of the problem? Is the usa funding a military police state or a fight on the war on drugs?

Recent photos from satellites released a few months ago from the state deparment and detailed in the NYT show production levels of coca up 20% last year.

War on Drugs is just a phrase used to fund militant activities in Colombia. Before this the phrase preferred by the politicians was a "War against the Communist" in central and south america.

The United States drives the press focus on the "War on Drugs" with its press conferences, and press releases. Paramilitants, Drug Zars, Farc are all guilty of many crimes. However, when an administration finds it fit, they will pick on one and forget about the others.

Paramilitants: (trained and supplied by the usa and colombia)
Why did the press forget about the paramilitary?

Perhaps its due to the stong links between the USA and the paramilitary that they choose to foget about the massive amounts of narco trafficking linked to them. Just as with the IRAN CONTRA scandal where the CIA ran a drug smuggling ring that created the biggest crack boom the USA had ever seen. Paramilitants were ignored in white house briefings because they were working in cooperation in the government. Like a big informant, given the green card to run free while they were deemed valuable.

Running rampant in Colombia along side the paramilitary was the Colombian army, and the US intelligence agencies / mercenaries. Well now the Colombian army has to realize this time has passed for true law and order to come to colombia. Its time to end dirty business.

I truely hope that the corruption in the colombian army and government changes. Are the current plans to overhaul and re-structure the colombian army genuine? Can we move away from the paramilitant way of business?

Root of everything (a stronger community):
Over half the people in Colombia live in poverty. 5 Million of the 40 something million people in this country are displaced. Desperate people will do anything to survive.

Salaries and min(basic) wages are very low, with little enforcement of violations to humane working conditions. Many families are surviving in shacks living off 1 persons salary of 1 buck an hour or less.

THis environment is very subjective to corruption. Many people respond saying this has nothing to do with it. Narco traffickers have alot of many. Well, many do, but many of them started in shattered homes.

In my heart i just know there is a better solution than fueling a bloody war with more guns. The bush administration has created many more terrorist and killed 600,000 Iraqis in the war in Iraq. International Intelligence agencies all show that the the war in Iraq has created a much higher threat by terrorist. What is different with colombia?

Blow up some FARC militants and kill people in the pueblos in the crossfire. You just create more FARC babies as the person mentioned above. Peaceful solutions must be found.

Although, crime appears to be much lower in major cities, as it is in many cases. Police force is one way to battle crime, and produces quick results for statistics and politicians to brag about.

However, long term goals must look at viewing the community as a whole. Colombia is not the richest country in the world, and we all know that. There is still a high level of oppression and the violation of human rights outside the major cities is a big problem.

Violence can end very easiliy.

Make cocaine legal, Make Heroine Legal!!! Traffickers will stop selling it, violence will drop 90% in colombia and across the world. Billions will be saved on a non winable war on drugs.

Treat addiction, Educate people, and create a stronger world wide community.

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juancegomez says on Oct 15, 2006, 15:51:

Cali2005 I agree with several of your conclusions, definitely (for example, I support drug legalization and the end of the war on drugs), but I also have a few things to say...

"Recent photos from satellites released a few months ago from the state deparment and detailed in the NYT show production levels of coca up 20% last year."

Yes, but if you take the time to read the fine print, you'd note that there was an important methodological difference that explains, to an unknown extent, the apparent increase in the figure. Where no such methodological innovations existed, such as in the UN study, the increase appeared to be quite smaller, 8%. In other words, it wasn't a simple "20% increase from one year to another".

Of course, the war on drugs is still conceptually flawed, even if you take that into account.

"War on Drugs is just a phrase used to fund militant activities in Colombia. Before this the phrase preferred by the politicians was a "War against the Communist" in central and south america."

In a sense, yes. But at the same time, a part of the money that could be better used to "fund militant activities" is wasted on Drug War operations that have little to no (or even quite negative and counterproductive) useful COIN purposes. In other words, the Drug War itself is also hurting the general war effort.

"However, when an administration finds it fit, they will pick on one and forget about the others."

Historically that has generally been the trend, you are correct, but it is not an absolute one either.

"Paramilitants: (trained and supplied by the usa and colombia)"

Vaguely speaking, yes. Strictly speaking, the answer is still yes, but that's not everything going on, not at all.

"Why did the press forget about the paramilitary?"

This particular article (and others of similar nature) does tend to forget about it, but others don't, and "the press" in general doesn't either

"Perhaps its due to the stong links between the USA and the paramilitary that they choose to foget about the massive amounts of narco trafficking linked to them."

Those links do exist (though, honestly, more between the Colombia state and the paramilitaries than between the U.S. and the paras, but those have existed too). Yet I don't really think that the situation is exactly comparable to what was happening in Central America, so that explanation is incomplete. And a bit inaccurate too, since U.S. (and Colombian) press outlets have also been quite critical of the paramilitaries and their role in the drug business too.

"Its time to end dirty business."

That's what we'd all want, of course.

"I truely hope that the corruption in the colombian army and government changes. Are the current plans to overhaul and re-structure the colombian army genuine? Can we move away from the paramilitant way of business?"

That's a good question and a real challenge. In a way, there has been some relative progress, but the structural behavior remains more or less inclined to permitting such a criminal modus operandi and/or partnership to continue, even if less openly, frequently and clearly than before.

"Root of everything (a stronger community):
Over half the people in Colombia live in poverty. 5 Million of the 40 something million people in this country are displaced. Desperate people will do anything to survive."

Of course, you are right in that it's a sizable part of "the root", but it is insufficient, by itself, when it comes to explaining it all. Poverty, abandonment and inequality isn't a Colombian monopoly.

"In my heart i just know there is a better solution than fueling a bloody war with more guns. The bush administration has created many more terrorist and killed 600,000 Iraqis in the war in Iraq."

While I am opposed to the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, you do seem to have misread the recent casualty numbers that came out. Please try to read the article(s) more carefully before you attribute all those deaths to the U.S. alone (even if, obviously, they are a byproduct of the invasion itself, and in that sense the U.S. is still responsible for them, indirectly...).

"International Intelligence agencies all show that the the war in Iraq has created a much higher threat by terrorist. What is different with colombia?"

Lots of things, actually.

"Blow up some FARC militants and kill people in the pueblos in the crossfire. You just create more FARC babies as the person mentioned above."

Yes, and also more paramilitary or military or criminal babies (meaning by that babies that will eventually participate in such activities, at some point in their lives), to be frank. That's the logic of prolonged conflicts and modern warfare.

"Peaceful solutions must be found."

I completely agree with the intention but, unfortunately, peace is often delayed as the prolonged struggle between the parties involved continues. The parties must talk and negotiate a peaceful end to all this, but they won't do so independently of the situation on the field of battle.

"There is still a high level of oppression and the violation of human rights outside the major cities is a big problem."

Yes, at the hands of all those groups involved.

"Violence can end very easiliy."

In theory, but not in practice. I'd wish though.

"Make cocaine legal, Make Heroine Legal!!! Traffickers will stop selling it, violence will drop 90% in colombia and across the world. Billions will be saved on a non winable war on drugs."

That won't automatically end violence, but it'd contribute to creating a climate where it could, eventually, be easier to handle.

Likewise, peace could also come without resolving the issue of drugs, though that could complicate things for a longer time, even after the conclict ended.

"Treat addiction, Educate people, and create a stronger world wide community."

I have no problem with that, in fact I also support such efforts.

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Sr Tertius says on Oct 19, 2006, 11:39:

Welcome to the Past "Regardless of all the continuing problems, I honestly don't see how Colombia is back to pre-Pastrana levels of insecurity and I don't believe that you've made the case for it here either."

Certainly, I didn't make a case for it. I could... somewhat. But I think that today's incident (car bomb in Cantón Norte) is more illustrative than any argument I could come up with.

"When the finger points to the moon, the fool looks at the finger" (Chinese proverb)

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juancegomez says on Oct 19, 2006, 14:30:

Not really, Sr Tertius Recall that the pre-Pastrana era security problems didn't have much to do with car bombs blowing or not blowing up in Bogotá once in a while, by any means.

Even if that had been the case, one such incident, no matter how grave, doesn't come close to matching the total impact of a much more sustained series of events.

"Una golondrina no hace verano" (a remark infamously used by a very different person in a very different sense, but still perfectly valid in this case).

What I was specifically talking about is this:

The day that the FARC is achieving the sort of prolonged military takeovers of towns and raids on military bases on a weekly/monthly basis, killing or kidnapping dozens or even hundreds of policemen and soldiers at the same time, indirectly forcing local police forces out of hundreds of small towns and constantly grounding traffic to a halt along several main roads, to the point that people actually became seriously afraid of road travel in general, then that argument would be justified.

Otherwise...nope.

My memory may be imperfect, like that of all human beings, but I do recall at least part of what was going on back then, and I don't see how that's comparable to what's going on now.

This isn't meant to blindly "cheer on" the current situation, much less the current administration's policies, but just explicitly referring to and pointing out that things have been far worse in the recent past.

The current situation and the current administration's policies can be criticized, something that they clearly deserve, based on their own merits and flaws.

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mcraig says on Oct 24, 2006, 11:35:

Nato in afganastan 10/16/2006 destroyed 16 tones of poppy , heroin an killed 17 militants. The war on drugs in afganstan is just starting to prosper give them a few years nobody is leaving afganstan anytime soon.

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Cali2005 says on Dec 22, 2006, 10:04:

Ecuador High Tensions W/ Uribe over Fumigation New coca spat leaves Colombia flying solo
Ecuador and Venezuela denounce a restart to Colombia's US-backed aerial fumigation campaign.
By Mike Ceaser | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

PUNTO ASIS, COLOMBIA – A decision by Colombia's conservative President Álvaro Uribe to restart the country's aerial fumigation of coca leaf plantations near the border with Ecuador appears to have further isolated him in a region increasingly unfriendly to Washington's war on drugs.
Last week's move has sparked a diplomatic row, with Ecuador recalling its ambassador to Colombia and vowing to file an official complaint to both the Organization of American States and the United Nations. Ecuador's leftist president-elect Rafael Correa, a close friend of Venezuela's anti-American president, Hugo Chávez, has even started recruiting other Latin leaders to oppose aerial fumigation.

In the Monitor
Friday, 12/22/06

New coca spat leaves Colombia flying solo

"It's simply unacceptable that they continue spraying from the air with glysophate," Mr. Correa said this week, referring to the herbicide used, a more concentrated version of Monsanto's Round-Up. "It kills legal crops on the Ecuadorean side and, apparently, also kills farmers."

Ecuador has activated its air defense system to monitor the fumigation planes, many of which are piloted by Americans. Colombia announced it was sending more troops to the 586 kilometer-long border, to keep Colombian leftist guerrillas from fleeing into Ecuador.

"There's a risk this could spiral out of control, which would be a tremendous setback for what [Mr. Uribe] is trying to accomplish in Colombia," says Michael Shifter, an analyst with the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington. The Colombia-Ecuador dispute could ruin relations between the neighbors and end Ecuador's cooperation with the Colombian military, says Mr. Shifter.

Colombia refusing to back down

But Uribe, whose government insists the herbicide is innocuous, has shown no willingness to back down. He pointed out that after Colombia suspended fumigation along the border a year ago in response to Ecuadorean complaints, plantations of coca leaf, the base ingredient used to make cocaine, boomed. Uribe described the situation as a global security issue.

"The whole world will have to comprehend that Colombia cannot permit the FARC to continue filling the area with drugs," he said of the border region, where leftist FARC guerrillas are active. "Because, with 10,200 hectares [25,205 acres], the FARC is capable of financing the destruction of the world."

Whatever the world's opinion, Uribe's Latin neighbors appear to be chilling to the US-backed war on coca, which Uribe has embraced enthusiastically. Colombia receives more than $700 million from Washington - mostly in military aid - each year to fight coca and the guerrillas who use it to finance their rebellion.

While Uribe has made progress in reducing Colombia's coca crop, neighboring Peru and Bolivia - both of which elected more leftward-leaning leaders in the past year - have advocated turning coca leaves into legal products, although they say they won't tolerate narcotrafficking.

Neighbors now more coca-friendly then ever

This week, Bolivian President Evo Morales, who made his name as a leader of the country's coca farmers, announced he wanted to expand the amount of coca that can be planted for legal uses, such as chewing the leaves (a longstanding traditional custom) or using them as religious and cultural symbols. Mr. Morales announced this week that Bolivia will increase the legal area for planting coca to 49,400 acres next year from 29,700 acres currently, disregarding limits set in a US-sponsored law. He also said that each family will be permitted to plant a small plot of coca.

The US ambassador to Bolivia, Philip Golderg, objected, warning that drug makers would inevitably purchase the coca leaves. Bolivia is the world's No. 3 cocaine producer after Colombia and Peru.

Venezuela's Chávez, who has repeatedly clashed with Washington, met with Ecuador's Correa on Wednesday and then called the US war on drugs a violation of regional nations' sovereignty.

"The battle against narcotrafficking has been imperialism's excuse for penetrating our nations, trampling our people, and having military presence in our countries," he said in backing Correa's objection to Colombia's renewed aerial spraying.

Even Peruvian President Alan Garcia, who has been friendly to Washington on many issues, touted the leaf's nutritional value.

"It can be consumed directly and elegantly in salad," Garcia said, adding that a chef had recently served several coca leaf-based dishes at the Government Palace.

Correa has also said he opposes the presence of the US military base at the Ecuadorean port of Manta - a key support for the US drug war in neighboring Colombia.

All of this leaves Uribe - and Washington - increasingly isolated. Many Latin Americans have long resented the US drug war, which they say forces them to bear the burden of America's vices.

Shifter says that Latin American hostility toward the drug war shows "a growing dissatisfaction with a policy that has failed."

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0 funny, 0 helpful.

chester says on Dec 24, 2006, 15:08:

Ecuadorean Skid Marks Screw those Ecuadorean pansies.

Uribe sh*ts bigger problems than Correa could ever cause Colombia.

0 funny, 0 helpful.