Security and Corruption under Uribe: Facts and Fiction

007CA says on Nov 25, 2005, 19:27:

A wikipedia website This seems to represent some different points of view regarding Uribe.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvaro_Uribe

Sr Tertius says on Nov 26, 2005, 22:23:

007CA, Thanks for the link Browsed through it, and it seems to generally stick to the facts. However, some of these facts are put together in a way that misleadingly suggests causality (sort of like putting "Saddam Hussein" and "9/11" in the same sentence, if you know what I mean). Inside the "Security Policy" section you can find the following statement:

"According to official government statistical information from August 2004, in two years, homicides, kidnappings, and terrorist attacks in Colombia decreased by as much as 50% - their lowest levels in almost twenty years. In 2003, there were 7,000 fewer homicides than in 2002 - a decrease of 27%."

Yes, homicides and kidnappings diminished, but a) I cannot put the numbers together to make a 50% reduction out of anything except massacres--which were conveniently redefined by Uribe to favor him statistically, dramatically reducing those crimes armed with nothing more than sheer arithmetics (who would've known! math saves lives!); and b) the big question is WHY did homicides and kidnappings diminish? was it ONLY due to national policies or did diametrically opposite local policies made any contributions? If so, to what extent? As I discussed in the original post, there is good reason to believe that they were not insignificant.

As for terrorist attacks... well, I'm not sure what definition is used in the wikipedia page, but it does not correspond to the numbers on attacks to infraestructure collected by the most reputable think-tank devoted to the armed conflict in Colombia, Seguridad y Democracia (which is, btw, rather pro-Uribe).

Nevermind, of course, the reduced credibility in government statistics after the scandal in DANE (http://elpais-cali.terra.com.co/paisonline/notas/Septiembre172004/a10.html). In fact, I couldn't find any reference to this incident in the wikipedia page. Hmmm...

Like many other issues, when you magnify them and look at them in detail, they don't look so pretty. I wish we could do that exercise with every topic covered by the wikipedia page. Any contributions?

"El que a hierro mata..."

"When the finger points to the moon, the fool looks at the finger" (Chinese proverb)

juancegomez says on Nov 27, 2005, 18:25:

Dirán algunos que se acabó la fiesta, supongo...
"If you dig a bit beyond the mindless slogans, they are mostly half-trues or blatant lies"


More the earlier than the former, I'd guess, but that's just my opinion. There are also plenty of both on the side of some of the people that dream of hanging Uribe from a lightpost, a la Mussolini...not far from being as bad as those that want to canonize him, I think.


"Improved security": Of who? Putumayo and Arauca are in open war. Just recently in Arauca, the government was forced to blackmail local transporters to play as cannon fodder during the armed strike. I'm sure those guys feel REALLY safe. Attacks by FARC against armed forces and infraestructure have not diminished but increased (see report by Seguridad y Democracia Foundation: http://www.seguridadydemocracia.org/datosConflicto.asp). And reinsterted paras seem to be selling their services to narcos and common criminals, according to recent press reports.


Specific terms aside, I agree with the concept but not entirely with the implementation here. Putumayo and Arauca have been some of the nerve centers of the conflict for at least a decade or so, so turning things around there is going to be much more difficult and complex, under Uribe or under anyone else.

Even if the numbers of attacks may have actually increased, as Rangel's S&D has reported, the nature of the attacks has changed. Quality over quantity, I'd say. The FARC is not launching the sort of attacks today, qualitatively speaking, as they did about an administration and a half ago.

The Colombian military, for better or for worse, is actually on the offensive in certain regions, as opposed to reeling from another round of Las Delicias, El Billar, Miraflores, or even a Mitú. This is not, obviously, something that can be totally attributed to Uribe per se, but rather its roots go back to Pastrana's days as well.

As for the reinserted paramilitaries, the bulk of them seem to be doing precariously fine for now. Logically, not everybody is going to want to play by the same rules, but most seem to have do so.


And yes, homicides and kidnappings diminished, but who is to get credit for that? Note that most improvements were in large cities, where local governments have implemented security policies that are actually opposed to the "Seguridad Democrática" doctrine, by local governments that have little sympathy for the central government. Why is Uribe taking credit for these improvements? (see report by UNDP: http://indh.pnud.org.co/boletin_hechos/index.plx?boletin=2;articulo=1;tema=1)


I wouldn't really argue the point itself too much, as again I agree with the main point, but I would question that those policies are actually directly opposed to and incompatible with Uribe's. It's probably not an "either this or that" situation.

Then again, what about the reinsertion of the paramilitaries (and admittedly, a few "fellow travelers") in Medellín, which seems to have been the most successful to date? Even taking into consideration that the infamous "Don Berna" is responsible for the relative peace in the comunas, I wouldn't give him the entire credit for that.

And what about recent problems in security in Bogotá, how do they fit within the lines of your proposed interpretation? Not saying that any interpretation of mine would be better, especially since I have yet to really produce any as such, but I think those are suggestive enough questions, that would make it worthy to take another look at the situation.


"Reduced corruption": Actually, according to Transparency International, corruption levels in Colombia have risen, not diminished (see http://www.transparency.org/surveys/dnld/indice_nal.pdf). From Teodolindo to the recent debacle in DAS, this administration has demonstrated to be one of the most corrupt Colombia has ever experienced.


The Teodolindo debacle speaks for itself, of course. Clearly business as usual in that area.

The debacle at the DAS, however, is hardly something new, given what several of us know or can deduce about that entity's history. If anything, the fact that the matter has led to its being treated like it is, has been actually been perceived as a positive for Uribe, from what I have noticed (not necessarily giving my personal opinion here, for the record, just what I've observed).

As for the statistics, I'm no scientist so I won't really try to make them talk more than they do (or don't actually). Still, I seem to remember seeing a more positive TI report somewhere, possibly a newer one. Of course, in any event, that information you've presented also covers perceptions and, curiously, also includes DANE information, so that should also be taken into account, both for and against. This is all on the "bad side" of the coin though, and the coin is almost never one sided.

On other subjects or subdivisions of the same, transparency has apparently actually increased up to a point, if you read the other TI reports I believe. So it's a mixed situation, and thus I wouldn't say whether it is substantially more or less corrupt than other administrations, especially when we are not making educated comparisons about them in a specific manner (not in a systematic one either).


"If not Uribe, then who?" Across the spectrum there are political figures in Colombia that are much more likely to perform better.


Agreed.


I'll leave the economy and the environment to another thread... maybe someone else can contribute.


I think the economy's having a slightly positive performance, due to many outside factors in part, but it may possibly have a rather mediocre future if things don't look up, certainly.

The environment's pretty much just as bad as it's been for a while, at least as far as high profile issues are concerned.


Less security, more corruption and plenty of alternatives. At least in these matters, Uribe has failed his own priorities: Colombia can do better without him. IF YOU DON'T THINK SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DATA THAT SUGGEST OTHERWISE.


Heh. I once again have to agree completely with the conclusion ("Colombia can do better without him"), but have my doubts about that specific description of the facts, as already addressed earlier in my post.


a) I cannot put the numbers together to make a 50% reduction out of anything except massacres--which were conveniently redefined by Uribe to favor him statistically, dramatically reducing those crimes armed with nothing more than sheer arithmetics (who would've known! math saves lives!);


Of course it does, but so does linguistics (IIRC).

Definitions and redefinitions are double edged swords, both in the field of statistics and that of language in general, wielded by both the "Uribes" and the "non-Uribes" (a very generalizing set of terms, I know, I'm using it as semi-creative shorthand for "a whole bunch of stuff that would take too long to type").

It's all part of a battle of discourses, basically.


and b) the big question is WHY did homicides and kidnappings diminish? was it ONLY due to national policies or did diametrically opposite local policies made any contributions? If so, to what extent? As I discussed in the original post, there is good reason to believe that they were not insignificant.


Taking into account what I've already mentioned, I agree here as well.


As for terrorist attacks... well, I'm not sure what definition is used in the wikipedia page, but it does not correspond to the numbers on attacks to infraestructure collected by the most reputable think-tank devoted to the armed conflict in Colombia, Seguridad y Democracia (which is, btw, rather pro-Uribe).


Hard to tell. From what I can see, that's likely a definition taken from the government's perspective, so I doubt that it is narrow enough to only include attacks on infrastructure (which seem to have been reduced in some specific areas, such as the Caño Limón pipeline).


Nevermind, of course, the reduced credibility in government statistics after the scandal in DANE (http://elpais-cali.terra.com.co/paisonline/notas/Septiembre172004/a10.html). In fact, I couldn't find any reference to this incident in the wikipedia page. Hmmm...


I'd say the reduced perception about the credibility of the DANE's statistics and go no further, taking into account that the scandal was about a delay in revealing information (possibly for political and strategical purposes, questionable as they may be), not an outright manipulation or fabrication of the stats themselves (beyond the battle of the discourses per se).


Like many other issues, when you magnify them and look at them in detail, they don't look so pretty.


Yup. Doesn't necessarily make them all ghoulish though.


I wish we could do that exercise with every topic covered by the wikipedia page. Any contributions?


It'd be a pretty interesting move, if done with enough time, respect and participation, surely. I probably won't start it, but if possible I'd give my two cents (which, logically, may possibly ruin someone's "party", as I implied in my response's title)

Sr Tertius says on Nov 28, 2005, 22:23:

Maybe we are using the wrong stick to measure Uribe "Putumayo and Arauca have been some of the nerve centers of the conflict for at least a decade or so, so turning things around there is going to be much more difficult and complex, under Uribe or under anyone else."

That's the realistic view. This administration's view was that setting up strong offensives like the "rehabilitation & consolidations zone" in Arauca, and the "retoma" of Putumayo, would significantly weaken the FARC. Those were crucial tests of the policy of "democratic security", and in both cases it failed.

"the nature of the attacks has changed. Quality over quantity"

"The Colombian military, for better or for worse, is actually on the offensive in certain regions, as opposed to reeling from another round of Las Delicias (...)"

Good points, but, can we translate these into a measure of performance that would tell us whether or not this qualitative transformation has resulted in improved security? You saw what happened in Cauca recently, and the repeated attacks to government forces in places like Iscuandé. Yes, the situation is different, but not too much. Some analysts are bracing themselves for further pre-electoral violence... are we really better off than before Uribe? If so, in light of the evidence, HOW? (Note: by "we" I mean all Colombians, or at least the majority, not just those that can travel to our fincas safely).

"I would question that those policies are actually directly opposed to and incompatible with Uribe's"

I think it was Mockus who best articulated the core differences between his approach to security and Uribe's, just to point to one case. No "informantes", no rewards to obscure characters for turning in their buddies, no need to restrict constitutional rights, citizen collaboration as a reasoned option (not at gunpoint), legitimacy as a precondition to order, and a long etcetera. In that case you have an "either or" situation, can't have it, logically, both ways.

"And what about recent problems in security in Bogotá, how do they fit within the lines of your proposed interpretation?"

I'd like to see the numbers.

"If anything, the fact that the matter has led to its being treated like it is [the DAS situation], has been actually been perceived as a positive for Uribe"

I don't know if that is the case, but if it is, it would show again Uribe's skillful manipulation of what should otherwise reflect negatively on him. Every time something goes wrong, Uribe turns to "fuses" to burn, like with Londoño, or his defense ministers, or the people at the top of DAS: Nothing wrong with the government, no, no, it's just these rotten apples that just happened to be appointed by him. As long as there are excuses, Colombia will keep sinking but Uribe will remain fresh clean of any responsibility.

"Still, I seem to remember seeing a more positive TI report somewhere, possibly a newer one."

I'd like to see it.

"the scandal [in DANE] was about a delay in revealing information (possibly for political and strategical purposes, questionable as they may be), not an outright manipulation or fabrication of the stats themselves"

Right, but it suggests a lack of independence of the guys who count from the guys who get counted, which wasn't solved at all by replacing the director with someone politically affiliated to Uribe. It just shows that everything is fair game for this administration, whose main purpose appears to be its own perpetuation. In that sense, we may be measuring Uribe with the wrong stick: in terms of self-perpetuation, he has been an astounding success.

"El que a hierro mata..."

"When the finger points to the moon, the fool looks at the finger" (Chinese proverb)

Mr. Hollywood says on Nov 29, 2005, 17:13:

2nd term curse ""If not Uribe, then who?" Across the spectrum there are political figures in Colombia that are much more likely to perform better."

Isn't that the curse of every president running for a 2nd term? That one must run against factual reality rather than campaign fantasy? Given the past performance of ALL Colombian presidents in the face of a pretty daunting set of problems, I'd say it's a fool's game guessing how any single individual might perform.

Sr Tertius says on Nov 29, 2005, 17:34:

A necessary game "Given the past performance of ALL Colombian presidents in the face of a pretty daunting set of problems, I'd say it's a fool's game guessing how any single individual might perform."

True, in part, but the electorate has to make a decision, one way or another, based on whatever information is available. Most of Uribe's potential contenders have experience in government or at least in public service. Admitedly, it's not the same to be the major of Pasto as being the president of Colombia, but that's the data that we have. Even if weighted by an uncertainty factor, I still don't see how the prospect of 4 more years of Uribe (given his record) could be any better that 4 years of his best contenders (given their partial record).

Of course, I would expect that the better informed electorate would look at the campaigns factoring out the fantasy/speculation factors. Maybe a fantasy in itself, but that's the democratic ideal.

"El que a hierro mata..."

"When the finger points to the moon, the fool looks at the finger" (Chinese proverb)