Juanes pide legalizar la droga para acabar el conflicto en Colombia

Miguel says on Aug 26, 2005, 12:01:

Estoy de aquerdo con el Will he repeat it onstage or to the Colombian press when the tour heads home? What would Bruce do? What would Willy do? (for you UC)

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gorgonabob says on Aug 27, 2005, 14:37:

amen the sooner the better

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juancegomez says on Aug 27, 2005, 21:42:

He's not so much of an airhead if he honestly meant half of what he said, then.

Then again, legalization from Colombia alone is impractical. We would need regional aid at the very least (possible to eventually get, if the continent keep turning to the left or center-left), and European and American support at best (not gonna happen anytime soon in the later case).

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cam0940 says on Aug 27, 2005, 23:25:

Can't happen. Beginning with my familiar disclaimer:

"From what I understand" while drug production is big business in Colombia, drug USE is scorned. It has been my experience that the drug user in Colombia is viewed as less than zero. Meanwhile, in those countries that consume drugs liberally, the costs to society are staggering. That is why the idea of legalizing drugs in Colombia may seem plausible in a society that doesn't have a problem with usage. But where this product ends up, and the damage it does there, is not something European or North American governments are going to support.

To blame drugs for providing the money to buy arms, and therefore legalizing drugs might be a step in the right direction is ludicrous anyway, because you're not doing anything about the demand side of the equation. If you eradicate plants, you drive up price, with an ambiguous effect on overall revenue. If you legalize production, it's still a lucrative venture for producers, even more so as they would no longer have to take the same protective measures to protect and deliver the product. In fact, legalizing drugs may yield GREATER revenues for the industry. Those that would use that money to buy arms and/or wage war would not be significantly affected.

I will admit that if you flood the market with coca, so as to drive the price down, that might affect rebel revenue and their ability to wage war. But then again, I read somewhere that only an estimated 30% of FARC revenue comes from narcotics related activities. Also, wouldn't they sabotage and/or destroy competitors in their reach? Wouldn't that lead to new violence?

On the other side of the coin, with an eradication program, you might drive the price up so high that end users just couldn't afford to buy the product, and that could affect revenue. But empirically that has proven nearly impossible to do.

I still think a diplomatic solution needs to be found that affects the rebels' and/or paramilitaries' will to use their resources to wage war.

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juancegomez says on Aug 28, 2005, 00:12:

First off, I don't really believe that legalization will end the war, but it will help to simplify things quite a bit. Not instantly, but eventually it will.

Second, it's only since 1994 that drug usage (of a certain quantity and with specific conditions, mind you) became "legal", due to a decision from the Constitutional Court (which can be read online for more details), striking down articles of a circa 1986 law that considered drug use a punishable offense.

Still, drug use is no small matter here. It might be far from hailed or celebrated, but drug users, as they do elsewhere, do exist and have always managed to do so, illegally or not. This also causes damages to our society and to individuals (though personally I think that, to be properly handled, it should be treated just as alcohol and tobacco are, really...allow its commercialization, with restrictions).

The thing is, if drug production is legalized at least at a certain international or regional level, it would be possible to set up legal enterprises and outlets to handle the business and even openly support the coca growers and co. in their work.

It would also free up all the resources that are tied up in an endless battle of prohibition that has no chance of victory unless extreme force is applied with zero concerns for the environment and human rights (which, really, isn't even case these days, even in the worst moments). Many harmful effects of the drug war will slow down and probably just stop, even if the latest symptoms continue to exist and have to be cleaned up.

Btw, I'm not really referring to just the FARC, but both to them, the paramilitaries, drug lords at large, etc. Estimates about FARC revenue are just that, estimates.

There's not enough information to reach a decisive conclusion yet, though previous estimates have recently been overriden by newer data, I believe, to an extent. Still, it's a fluid business, so one can imagine that the participation of the armed actors is also fluid.

They will probably learn to adapt to a new situation, but if the price goes down, other alternatives will have to be found and that's not going to be easy, as if something's illegal, it instantly becomes much more valuable than it ever would be, legally.

The problem with the diplomatic solution is that, in the case of the rebels, they want to "come out on top", so to speak (they want to gain specific political powers, to include specific reforms, to be mostly unpunished for their actions, and to keep their weapons until they judge that it's safe to disarm if at all...so if the negotiation doesn't earn them political points, then they'll use it for military and economic points ), and in the case of the paramilitaries, they want to be "let off the hook" (they want to be punished as little as possible if at all, want to avoid extradition, and want to be able to be influential players in national life regardless of their current or previous status). It's a real Gordian knot and I don't see how somebody can cut it just yet.

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cam0940 says on Aug 28, 2005, 02:22:

I guess what I'm trying to say is that legalizing drugs, as with crop eradication, brute military force, and virtually all previous attempts to bring peace to Colombia, you're still not addressing the concerns of the rebels and/or paramilitaries. It is an economic adjustment that may or may not change the dynamics of the violence, but certainly will not end it.

As long as consumers demand the product, those with the means to cultivate and process it will continue to do so, legally or illegally.

The most viable option (although still obviously complicated), would be to eliminate the FARC/paramilitaries need for arms/training/violence. Suppose for example, just as a hypothetical illustration, that through infrasture development, job training, and/or subsidy, progressive means to make a living were offered the proletariat. Let's say this leftist group were given seats for representation in Congress. Pardons and reparations even, for those earlier evils that gave rise to the current dilemna. Economically speaking, the cost may be cheaper than the status quo. It would broaden Colombia's economic output and modernize the economy. Productivity could soar. In two generations' time, we could see all boats begin to rise. And you could eliminate the need for leftist guerillas to take arms, thereby making the paramilitaries obsolete as well. Well, not obsolete, but you'd take away the historic justification for their existence. Then of course, you'd have to do something about the ELN.

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cam0940 says on Aug 28, 2005, 02:23:

I guess what I'm trying to say is that legalizing drugs, as with crop eradication, brute military force, and virtually all previous attempts to bring peace to Colombia, you're still not addressing the concerns of the rebels and/or paramilitaries. It is an economic adjustment that may or may not change the dynamics of the violence, but certainly will not end it.

As long as consumers demand the product, those with the means to cultivate and process it will continue to do so, legally or illegally.

The most viable option (although still obviously complicated), would be to eliminate the FARC/paramilitaries need for arms/training/violence. Suppose for example, just as a hypothetical illustration, that through infrasture development, job training, and/or subsidy, progressive means to make a living were offered the proletariat. Let's say this leftist group were given seats for representation in Congress. Pardons and reparations even, for those earlier evils that gave rise to the current dilemna. Economically speaking, the cost may be cheaper than the status quo. It would broaden Colombia's economic output and modernize the economy. Productivity could soar. In two generations' time, we could see all boats begin to rise. And you could eliminate the need for leftist guerillas to take arms, thereby making the paramilitaries obsolete as well. Well, not obsolete, but you'd take away the historic justification for their existence. Then of course, you'd have to do something about the ELN.

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cam0940 says on Aug 28, 2005, 02:29:

OR maybe I'm just naive. But in the history of the world, aside from religious movements, revolution has been caused by lack of representation. Revolution comes about from concentrated power ignoring the needs of the populace. How is the situation in Colombia that different? Because the FARC has yet to be able to topple the government, this thing could go on for decades to come. Imagine the costs of waging battle for 50 years. The FARC would have to concede that they cannot topple the government and take over, while the government would have to make reconciliatory policy changes.

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juancegomez says on Aug 28, 2005, 09:10:

"you're still not addressing the concerns of the rebels and/or paramilitaries. It is an economic adjustment that may or may not change the dynamics of the violence, but certainly will not end it."

True, but then again, those concerns are quite complex in their own right to begin with. Still, if the economic context that surrounds those concerns changes, that might as well have an effect worth taking notice.

"As long as consumers demand the product, those with the means to cultivate and process it will continue to do so, legally or illegally."

I agree.

"The most viable option (although still obviously complicated), would be to eliminate the FARC/paramilitaries need for arms/training/violence."

In theory, I fully agree with you.

"Suppose for example, just as a hypothetical illustration, that through infrasture development, job training, and/or subsidy, progressive means to make a living were offered the proletariat."

In theory that's just perfect by me. But implementing that, given numerous contextual issues both nationally and internationally, is not easy.


"Let's say this leftist group were given seats for representation in Congress. Pardons and reparations even, for those earlier evils that gave rise to the current dilemna."

Ideally, I'd once again agree. One problem is that by now (or even 20 years ago, really, despite possible impressions to the contrary) they want more than standing for election to get seats in Congress to begin with. They want, roughly speaking, to be part of, or just as well, directly being able to influence, the working of the executive, the legislative and judiciary at both national and local levels.

They want seats in Congress, they want seats in a new Constitutional Assembly (so far so good, clearly), and they want to either directly be part of a new government or to effectively pressure the current one to make progress on all the mentioned such reforms and more. And they want to begin to get all this *before* or without laying down their arms nor fully stopping their military operations (initially, until they consider that it's "justified" to abandon them...but in the meanwhile...).

Logically, they also want pardons (which means at least partial impunity, probably to a greater degree than in the current paramilitary process unless the FARC suddenly get really self-critical out of thin air) and even to form part of a new Armed Forces. That might have been workable 20 or 10 years ago, but now nationally and internationally those two developmens would be seen as morally, legally and judicially quite worrisome by NGOs, the ICC and other tribunals, victims groups, the United States government and others.

Not to mention that say, beginning to breaking off the drug war as part of the negotiations, stopping fumigations and extraditions of guerrillas to the U.S., would be seen as an aggressive measure by Bush and most of his potential successors, so they'd retaliate in unkind ways.

In other words, the FARC believe that they're perfectly justified to continue standard operations until progress is made on all such fronts at the point of a rifle. It is the government and the rest of the country that should prove first that the FARC can and should abandon the armed struggle, before they even seriously consider doing so. But such behavior on their part carries a very worrying connotation both nationally and internationally, to say the least.

Given such conditions, getting not just the government but the armed forces, the economic sectors, public opinion and other diversely interested parties to simply accept all this will be quite complex and tiresome. Lots of controversy and infighting will ensue among hundreds of thousands of people and tension will be high because of incidents, that will threaten to break off the entire thing into little pieces.

Ironically, the FARC's attitude may even have moral justification but pragmatically it's really counterproductive. If the leadership of a group of 20,000 were more flexible and swallowed their ego and self-messianism, even in the worst case scenario, Colombia would move at the speed of other South American countries even if it did not immediately solve *any* of the problems. But by not doing so, they're making things *worse*, feeding their own discourse but cutting it off at the same time.

"And you could eliminate the need for leftist guerillas to take arms, thereby making the paramilitaries obsolete as well. Well, not obsolete, but you'd take away the historic justification for their existence. Then of course, you'd have to do something about the ELN.
"

The paramilitaries and their supporters would also have their own opinions and reactions to the controversial issues that I've outlined above, specially with regards to continued guerrilla activity even in the midst of the negotiations and reforms.

The ELN, though they have for the most part historically stayed away from any and all real negotiations in spite of the existence of recent contacts, could be easier to please because on the surface their demands are simpler, at least in theory they want a National Convention to be convoked in order to discuss and decide how to resolve the country's problems. That would have its own issues, but it's easier than what the FARC demand to begin him. The problem is that the wider context and the circumstances have jeopardized both such a solution and the steps leading to it (the ELN doesn't want to stop kidnapping in the meanwhile, for example).

"maybe I'm just naive. But in the history of the world, aside from religious movements, revolution has been caused by lack of representation."

That might well be the original cause in this case, I agree.

"Revolution comes about from concentrated power ignoring the needs of the populace."

True, if by "revolution" you mean the existence of a small political sector that opts to take arms in order to force change in abstract representation of the majority, and not necessarily the existance of a huge mass movement in itself.

However, such small political sectors or their armed factions were mostly squashed in the rest of South America, without really solving any of the original problems that gave birth to them (token measures were taken but the fundamentals remained the same).

"How is the situation in Colombia that different? Because the FARC has yet to be able to topple the government, this thing could go on for decades to come. Imagine the costs of waging battle for 50 years. The FARC would have to concede that they cannot topple the government and take over, while the government would have to make reconciliatory policy changes."

Yep, it really can go on for decades in theory, though one would hope that the next generation of both guerrillas and government/society sectors could begin to change its positions, if both the national and international context facilitates it, which is unknown.

The guerrillas, unfortunately, have the patience and ambition of Mao Tse Tung (though he had a much better hand to play with, clearly), and at the same time it's possible that successive governments will not significantly reexamine their own positions if the guerrillas and other circumstances continue to be more or less the same they are now. Periodic negotiations could happen, but if the same problems and tensions manifest...the cycle could continue for another decade.

You're not too naive, in my opinion, at least not more naive than the rest of us with similar positions, really...

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protocol13 says on Aug 29, 2005, 15:40:

Estoy de acuerdo en que se debe legalizar no solo en Colombia, si no tambien, en el resto de las naciones. Como sigue las cosas, la presente solucion no sirve ni un comino. en la era de la prohibion en USA, el alcohol estaba prohibido. Para lo unico que sirbio es incrementar la venta del alcohol, fomentar violencia entre los mafiosos por el control de trafico ilegal del alcohol y incrementar la delinquencia. Al fin, el gobierno de USA se dio cuenta que estas leyes no valian un carajo y lo legalizo. Ahora, el gobierno recibe un gran suma de dinero por los impuestos. Seria bueno que al legaizarse, tambien se cobre un impuesto alto y usar parte de este dinero para dar mas educacion en las escuelas primarias y secundarias sobre la que causa una droga adicion y para el cuidado medico de los drogadictos.

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cam0940 says on Aug 29, 2005, 15:58:

Well protocol I see what you're saying, but you can't really compare alcohol and drug addiction in the same vein. For one, drugs such as cocaine or heroin are far more addictive and destructive than alcohol. True, the late 20s and early 30s were very bloody in the United States.

I commented earlier on the probable effects in Colombia, and the original article was talking about legalizing drugs (obviously talking about cocaine) in Colombia as a strategy to contain/reduce violence there.

The drug game still represents a meaningful percentage of FARC and paramilitary income. If you legalize it, so every Juan Doe can become a producer, I think you'll have more violence as FARC and paramilitaries try to dictate who can grow and who can't, regardless of what the law says. They're already murdering campesinos who don't sell to "approved" buyers. Imagine what would happen if you were to try to exercise your new right to grow? You'd have 50 of them coming over the ridgeline to burn your operation down and put two in the back of your head. The FARC isn't going to let every Tom, Dick, and Harry flood the market with cocaine just because it's legal to grow it. Even if the government says you have to have some type of license or approval for it to be legal, ultimately, when the sun goes down, the FARC and the paramilitaries are going to be the ones saying who can grow and who can't.

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protocol13 says on Aug 29, 2005, 16:20:

You may be asuming that others in other countries will not be involved in a legalized drug business and will not give each other a run for the money. I can see Mexicans or Americans (remember California and Hawaii's #1 crop is marijuana, Missouri is #1 in meth production)or Nigerians or Peruvians or Bolivians or Vietnamese or Philippines or.... giving the FARC/ELN/AUC or any other group in Colombia competition for the drug business. What will be the effect of this competition? The highlands of Bolivia and Peru are better for coca plant production than in Colombia , whereas Mexico and Nigeria are closer to the demand market of the USA and Europe, and Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Burma and Vietnam have thousands of years of experience in producing more efficient poppy fields. Recently a former DEA agent and a current Judge, that support drug legalization, got interviewed at a local radio station in Los Angeles and they gave the main reason for legalization being the present failure of drug policies and the immense corrupcion that it brings. In the USA, bankers, soldiers,diplomats, DEA agents, policemen, judges, politicians, custom agents among others have been arrested for drug trafficking. It is time for drastic change as current international drug policies are simply a complete failure.

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cam0940 says on Aug 29, 2005, 16:56:

Well written and international competition would become a reality wherever production is legalized. I understood the scope of the article to be Colombia. There, the FARC/paramilitaries would not relinquish control easily.

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cam0940 says on Aug 29, 2005, 17:21:

Jeez you know, pot maybe. But cocaine, heroin, meth, acid... if you don't fight those I think the social costs could be incalculable.

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