romy says on Apr 2, 2008, 20:57:
you know it's hard for me to believe because I'm reading 'What the FARC papers show us about latin american terrorism' published by NEFA April 1, 2008 (http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefafarc0408....)
and it seems to me like if they actually believe in the kind of evidence they say to have, then it's a no-brainer Chavez is a sponsor of terror (directly acting against Colombia) you wouldn't deal with your enemy.
From that report:
Chávez and the FARC
A letter from Manuel Marulanda to the Secretariat dated January 11, 2007:
Marulanda, the FARC’s top leader, proposes a clandestine meeting between
FARC leadership and Chávez. The meeting should be clandestine to “avoid a great
campaign by the gringos against Chávez.� In a statement that shows that the
relationship with Chávez is still not fully cemented, Marulanda says the FARC must “make
him understand, through dialogue and the exchange of opinions, that we are strategic
allies for them. They have money and we do not. What they are offering is valuable, but
it is not enough, the same as the loan. When someone loans money it is because his
friend is trusted, and we do not know if we enjoy that trust.� The communication also
makes it clear the FARC still views itself as a socialist vanguard out to defeat capitalism.
Marulanda says that the Venezuelans doubt that the FARC can take power
militarily given the high level of U.S. support the Uribe government receives: “We must
make them understand that we must create a great revolutionary army with mass
support to overthrow the capitalist system and install socialism. Because of that, even
though they see us as a small force, we have a great future and they must believe us
because we are not isolated and alone.�
A letter from Marulanda to the Secretariat dated September 22, 2007:
Marulanda circulates the draft of an official letter to Chávez, asking for comments.
He stresses the need for the Humanitarian Accord, centered on the exchange of
prisoners. He suggests that the FARC and Chávez approach the governments of
Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and perhaps France, Switzerland, and
Spain, to help move the process forward.
The proposal, which is consistent with the FARC’s position throughout, states
that the FARC should be recognized as a “belligerent force,� and be removed from the
list of terrorist organizations by both the United States and Europe. The FARC would
then turn over its hostages to one of the countries, at the same time the Colombian
government turned over senior FARC leaders in prison, to a third party.
In an interesting aside, given Reyes’ death a few months later, Marulanda says he
is “only going to use the radio for short transmissions from now on, in order to avoid a
massacre. We were six hours on the radio while the aircraft located us and our messages
are longer all the time.� Did he say locate or located?
Attached to the note is the draft of the letter to Chávez ,where the FARC leader
says that what is most important is to “establish, between your government and the
FARC, friendly political relations, for the good of both countries and the dream of the
liberator Simón BolÃvar will become reality, thanks to the process led by your
government and FARC in Colombia.�
A letter from a member of the Secretariat to Marulanda dated October 4, 2007:
The letter summarizes conversations between FARC leaders and Ramón
RodrÃguez ChacÃn, Venezuela’s interior and justice minister and close friend of Chávez.
ChacÃn has played an important role on behalf of Chávez in maintaining contact with
the FARC leadership.
The letter said Chávez will press for a summit meeting with FARC commanders
inside Colombian territory, a move that they believe would embarrass Uribe and
enhance the prestige of the FARC:. “If this happens, Chávez would be accompanied by
presidents Ortega (Nicaragua), Evo (Morales, Bolivia),and Correa (Ecuador), who are
‘fatherland or death’ with Chávez.� The author assures Marulanda he would have a
private meeting with Chávez during the summit.
The letter discusses elaborate security arrangements for moving the FARC
leadership, undertaken by the Venezuelan government. The letter says the movement
would be a secret mission and only Chávez and his emissary would know what was
happening: “At all times we would be accompanied by Rodriguez ChacÃn, an expert in
this type of security. The pilots, who are trustworthy, won’t know where they are going
or for what purpose. The Venezuelan government will be responsible for transportation,
and it will be in an armored helicopter. If we agree they will add another helicopter as an
escort. Included in the security detail would be units that we trust completely,
commanded by Timo and Iván. The refueling site would be secured by the government.�
A letter from Marulanda to the Secretariat dated November 20, 2007:
Marulanda discussed the need to build long-term, solid relations with the
“friendly neighbor.�
It is clear that by this time some money has arrived. Marulanda writes that the
FARC was able to fulfill its strategic and economic goals “thanks to the support of the
300. It is not yet established if that is a loan or given in solidarity, but it solves a serious
strategic problem of the aggression of the gringos. At first glance it seems the man
(Chávez) is interested in supporting the Bolivarian cause of the FARC in order to
strengthen his geopolitical strategy in various countries.�
A letter from Iván Rios to the Secretariat dated December 23, 2007:
The note is a report on two days of meetings with Rodriguez ChacÃn, a sitting
minister in Chávez’s cabinet: “With relation to the 300, which we will call the ‘dossier’
from here forward, there are already efforts underway, on orders of the boss of the
cripple. I will comment on this in a separate note. We will call the boss ‘Angel,’ and the
cripple ‘Ernesto.’�
A letter from Jorge Briseño, a member of the Secretariat, to other members of the
Secretariat, dated January 14, 2008:
The letter was written four days after the FARC freed two high profile hostages,
turning them over Chávez. While the move was greeted as positive, the FARC suffered a
significant setback when it could not locate the child of one of the hostages, who had
been born in captivity. It turned out the child had been turned over to Colombian social
service workers several years before. The snafu clearly upset Chávez. However, following
the release, Chávez followed through on his part of the deal by publicly calling for the
FARC to be removed from the list of terrorist organizations and be accorded recognition
as a belligerent force because it is an “insurgent force with a political project.�23
“The recognition of the FARC as a belligerent force by the Venezuelan president
and his invitation to the rest of the world to remove us from the terrorism list means we
must be much more careful in our dealings with him, especially at the level of the
Secretariat. Those who can best carry on relations are Timo and Iván, who are on the
border.�
“The handing over of the two prisoners, so as not to use the word hostages, to
president Chávez, received worldwide coverage. We should not feel defeated by our
own naiveté and lack of capabilities, and those of Hugo (Chávez), which made us look
bad. Now our struggle is with those that remain…we know now we have a treasure, and
that is why they are searching for it in the jungle, the rivers, the mountains and the
plains.� This seems to be a reference to Ingrid Betancourt, and her value to the FARC.
In the same letter, the author states that the “dossier,� as they call the mysterious
“300�, belongs to “the collective leadership, requiring tact, a cool head, skill and
responsibility� to handle properly.
A letter from commanders Iván and Ricardo to the Secretariat dated February 8,
2008:
The letter refers back to the person dubbed Angel in the December 23, 2007
communications regarding the business to be undertaken with the “300� or “dossier.�
The business proposals appear to be ranked from the riskiest and potentially most
profitable to the least risky but least profitable. Angel, it is noted, received the letter from
Marulanda, the FARC’s most senior commander, and seemed pleased with it. It is unlikely
Marulanda would write a letter if the business was not of utmost importance to the
FARC.
“He (Angel) offered us a business opportunity in which we would receive an
allotment of oil to sell outside the country, which would give us a juicy profit. Another
offer is the sale of gasoline in Venezuela or Colombia. Using the ‘dossier,’ we set up a
profitable company in Venezuela, with the possibility of obtaining government
contracts…Angel designated Ernesto to coordinate this.�
It seems highly unlikely that the FARC could undertake the establishment of a
business in Venezuela that could obtain government contracts, without the permission
and knowledge of president Chávez.
The letter says that president Chávez is requesting certain actions from Manuel
(Marulanda) and proceeds to review the plans for the FARC to turn over to Chávez 47
hostages, while the Colombian government turned over 500 FARC prisoners to be held
separately in Venezuela. The three Americans would only be included in the group if the
two FARC prisoners in the United States were freed.
“He (Chávez) is planning to create something similar to the ‘Contadora Group,’
which would be called the Bolivar Group or the Isla Margarita Group. This group would
work for the recognition of the FARC as a belligerent force, and would push hard for a
peace process in Colombia. The group would be composed of Venezuela, Argentina,
Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, and Nicaragua. We could also invite France, Switzerland,
and Spain. Of course the FARC would be present at all the meetings. It would be a de
facto recognition of the belligerent status of the FARC…Chávez asks that when the group
is formally installed, we turn over Ingrid (Betancourt). He said he requests this, but will
respect whatever decision we make.�
The final document is a letter from Manuel Marulanda to Chávez, dated February
2008, In the Mountains of Colombia:
The letter is a general exposition of the FARC’s view of the war, the U.S.
involvement in the war, and seems to be an attempt to assuage any misgiving Chávez
may still harbor about the group, going to some length to show that both Chávez and
the FARC have the same overarching goals. The letter also goes to great lengths to
flatter Chávez, thanking him particularly for his efforts to achieve international
recognition for the FARC as a belligerent force and for his “true, wise and responsible�
leadership.
0 funny, 0 helpful.
